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Swedens strategy has been that of a drunken gambler going all in from day 1.
Even with little knowledge of the virus it was reckless, let’s look at why:
Even with little knowledge of the virus it was reckless, let’s look at why:
asymmetric risk:
Even if you are fairly confident your assumptions are right, you need to understand the worst case scenario if they are not.
Even a 90/10 split is reckless if 10% of the time, the outcomes are catastrophic.
Even if you are fairly confident your assumptions are right, you need to understand the worst case scenario if they are not.
Even a 90/10 split is reckless if 10% of the time, the outcomes are catastrophic.
Humans tend to misvalue tail-risk:
A 90% probability is not the same as a certainty.
If you only have one chance the 10% event will happen, it may still be the only thing that happens.
You must prepare to mitigate for the worst case scenario.
A 90% probability is not the same as a certainty.
If you only have one chance the 10% event will happen, it may still be the only thing that happens.
You must prepare to mitigate for the worst case scenario.
If you got a bag containing 20 candies, but one was certain to kill you, you wouldn’t eat 19 of them assuming you’d win.
You’d probably dispose safely of the entire bag, because the risk-reward just doesn’t make eating any of them worthwhile.
You’d probably dispose safely of the entire bag, because the risk-reward just doesn’t make eating any of them worthwhile.
Yet Tegnell et al bet on a number of assumptions where there was no indication that their assumptions were even a more than 50% bet.
They bet the house on the odds of getting a Royal Flush.
That’s just reckless.
They bet the house on the odds of getting a Royal Flush.
That’s just reckless.
Being wrong is one thing, a lot of people have been wrong.
But betting it all on one low-probability gamble is criminally reckless.
It is so reckless it doesn’t even belong in a casino, let alone a nations pandemic-management.
But betting it all on one low-probability gamble is criminally reckless.
It is so reckless it doesn’t even belong in a casino, let alone a nations pandemic-management.
There are no excuses: no intentions or “acting on what we knew at the time” that can cover up what has happened or absolve those in charge for what has passed. They all belong in jail.
It is quite clear to me no one with any influence in the Swedish pandemic management has had any useful background in statistics, probability or.. even gambling.
Let’s look at some or their clearly in advance less than 50% gambles/assumptions:
* Immunity lasts long enough to build societal here immunity.
Wishful thinking. No precedence in the family of Coronaviruses.
* Immunity lasts long enough to build societal here immunity.
Wishful thinking. No precedence in the family of Coronaviruses.
Children are immune:
Wishful thinking. How many viruses are there that children are immune to?
Wishful thinking. How many viruses are there that children are immune to?
Covid is not that lethal:
They had no data to make such an assumption, and it proved wrong.
They had no data to make such an assumption, and it proved wrong.
Presymptomatic & asymptomatic spread does not exist: also, wishful thinking. Exposed very early on.
I could go on and on.
But in general, the assumptions they rested their decisions on were nothing but wishful thinking, based on neither data nor similar precedents.
But in general, the assumptions they rested their decisions on were nothing but wishful thinking, based on neither data nor similar precedents.
Given a risky scenario, in the absence of data and evidence, you must speculate what the worst surprise that may hide in the unknown could be then mitigate that risk.
You are still likely to be wrong and underestimate, but at least you are not being entirely reckless.
You are still likely to be wrong and underestimate, but at least you are not being entirely reckless.
