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Few words on Navalny and Putin (a thread based on @OSW_pl analysis to be translated soon) 1/10 https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2021-01-18/zatrzymanie-nawalnego-po-powrocie-do-rosji
2. The behavior of both Navalny and Putin resembles a high-stakes gamble on their future and the future of Russia as a whole. Navalny's return to the country is a challenge to Putin, who had most likely ordered him to be killed earlier, which failed due to the FSB's ineptitude.
3. Navalny knew that after his return, he would be likely to be imprisoned and in the future there was a high risk of losing his life (in a situation where Navalny ridicules the FSB and the Kremlin what is treated by Putin as crossing the red line).
4.The alternative for Navalny was the fate of a political emigrant w/ a gradually waning political influence. The return, although may temporarily neutralize him as a protest leader, seriously strengthens his political capital & makes him a symbol & undisputed opposition leader
5. If Navalny survives, in the future, when some spark triggers the accelerated collapse of Putin's system, he will become the main real political alternative for Putin. If he dies - he will find many - increasingly agitated and less fearful - followers in Russia.
6. In this situation, the Kremlin focuses on escalating repression & openly transforming 
into a dictatorship violatong its own law. In this action, disproportionate to the real threat & designed to intimidate, it may, however, cross the invisible border, leading to rebellion.
into a dictatorship violatong its own law. In this action, disproportionate to the real threat & designed to intimidate, it may, however, cross the invisible border, leading to rebellion.
7. The Kremlin is unable to offer Russian society the prospect of prosperity or even stability. Whether, when and under what circumstances such an outbreak or any other political turning point in Russia will take place is however unknown, both for Putin and for Navalny.
8. Repression against Navalny & especially his potential death, is also risky for the Kremlin for external reasons: it would constitute a serious argument against those Western politicians who would like to "normalize" relations with Russia and return to cooperation with Moscow.
9.Therefore, Navalny's fate will depend on the Kremlin's calculation of risk, which may be influenced not only by the internal situation, but also by the attitude of Western states/structures - to what extent they'll reliably threaten w/severe sanctions if Navalny is harmed.
w/severe sanctions if Navalny is harmed.
10. Russia's future depends primarily on the Russians themselves b/the West has to answer the question which Russia is in its interest: the known aggressive Putinist dictatorship or the risk of democratic change? And if/how much the West is ready to support such a change in ?
?
