Khamenei’s office issues a series of interviews with members of the “JCPOA Monitoring Council” discussing Khamenei’s guidelines.
The council is composed of conservatives and “moderates”, with members like Rouhani, Larijani, Zarif, Salehi, Jalili, Kharazi, Velayati & Ghalibaf
The council is composed of conservatives and “moderates”, with members like Rouhani, Larijani, Zarif, Salehi, Jalili, Kharazi, Velayati & Ghalibaf
The interviews were held in the context of Khamenei’s last speech, and are clearly meant to show that the regime is in full consensus with Khamenei’s line of thought — the kind of “rallying around the flag” rhetoric Tehran has taken many times in 2003-05 (per Rouhani’s memoirs) https://twitter.com/carmiomer/status/1347682604724744192
What do these interviews try to show?
1 - The notion that Iran is in “no hurry” for the US to return to the JCPOA. Jalili & Velayati noted that if sanctions aren’t lifted, Iran won’t rush into a deal & Kharazi explained that Iran must first see how the Biden admin will act https://twitter.com/carmiomer/status/1349336067997052928
1 - The notion that Iran is in “no hurry” for the US to return to the JCPOA. Jalili & Velayati noted that if sanctions aren’t lifted, Iran won’t rush into a deal & Kharazi explained that Iran must first see how the Biden admin will act https://twitter.com/carmiomer/status/1349336067997052928
2 - The idea that Iran’s final goal isn’t a deal with the US, but rather sanctions removal. Ghalibaf & Zarif explained that this shouldn’t be only “on paper” lift, but that Iran should be able to sell oil, import & export goods, access its frozen assets & intl. banking system etc
3 - The notion that even if sanctions are not lifted, Iran can reduce their effects. Kharazi explained that if the Iranian people can neutralize sanctions with resistance economy, the other side will realize that it cannot bring Iran to its knees using sanctions https://twitter.com/carmiomer/status/1242217356039946242
4 - The narrative that America isn’t trustworthy. Velayati explained that “When [they] have such a bad record of fulfilling their commitments, we have a right to be pessimistic”, and Jalili noted that the US just introduced sanctions under “new labels” as part of “max pressure”
5 - The notion that Iran will have its own demands in any future negotiations. Almost all of the officials noted that Iran learned its lessons from the “Barjam [JCPOA] experience” and Velayati specified that Tehran will demand the removal of the Snapback Mechanism from the deal
6 - The idea that Iran’s recent nuclear steps are means to create diplomatic leverage - a tactic Iran used in the past. Ghalibaf revealed that Araghchi & Zarif already managed to leverage these steps in their diplomatic talks, and Kharazi noted that they resist US coercion https://twitter.com/carmiomer/status/1346082421943525383
7 - The promise that the road ahead will be based on “commitment for commitment”. Zarif noted that he follows Khamenei’s orders (which according to him are the same in public and private), which articulate a reciprocal policy: “signature for signature”, “execution for execution”
8 - The refusal to discuss Iran’s missile program or regional presence. Larijani explained that the US is trying to remove Iran’s sources of power, and Jalili noted that when a party feels it can achieve one demand using pressures, it’s natural it will have more demands later https://twitter.com/carmiomer/status/1349118504285458434
9 - The idea that the Biden admin will also be anti-Iran. Jalili reminded that some of Biden’s nominations were the “architects of sanctions” against Iran, and that they will simply replace “maximum pressure” with “smart pressure” based on international coalitions
10 - The fact that the decision to reduce Iran’s commitments under the JCPOA and enrich to 20% was Khamenei’s decision. Kharazi explained that AEOI chief Salehi had concerns re the step, but that after “The Leadership” [i.e. Khamenei] ordered him to do it, he had no worries https://twitter.com/gesfandiari/status/1348984488450269188