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Alright, so today we are returning to the War of the Spanish of Succession. Last time I left off on a bit of a cliffhanger, with Franco-Bavarian forces on Vienna’s metaphorical doorstep while Flanders, Italy, and Spain were under firm Bourbon control.
If you haven’t already, please check out the previous thread in this series (and all the ones before that one). Today we will be looking at the 1704 campaign up to Blenheim. The Blenheim thread will hopefully come out later today. https://twitter.com/JasonLHughes/status/1341810062453583872?s=20
It was clear that something had to be done to save Vienna, or the war was as good as over. Marlborough in particular was well aware of the dire situation in Bavaria and thus planned one of the most brilliant campaigns of the age that would uproot the balance of power in Bavaria.
Marlborough, without consulting his Dutch allies (who were understandably wary about reducing the strength of Allied forces in Flanders), planned to march his contingent of 20,000 (mostly) British soldiers 250 miles from the southern Netherlands to Bavaria.
Marlborough started his march from Bedburg (near Cologne) on May 19th and arrived at Launsheim on June 22nd. Along the way he was joined by 20,000 Danish, Dutch, Prussian, Hessian, and Hanoverian soldiers.
The rate of march for Marlborough’s force was rather unextraordinary. His troops averaged around 7.5 miles per day (which French troops often exceeded during the conflict). Rather, the march was remarkable for the total distance covered and the condition of the troops at its end.
The march featured excellent logistical preparations, with British agents being sent ahead of the army to mass supplies. The British were greatly aided by having access to hard cash (a rare luxury), which made locals along the march route far more willing to sell their goods.
Marlborough correctly predicted that the French forces of Villeroy in Flanders would shadow the British along the Rhine to prevent a crossing into Alsace (a crossing he feinted with pontoon bridges), thus preventing an assault on Dutch possessions during his absence.
All in all, the march was a remarkable feat that shaped the course of the 1704 campaign in Bavaria (which in turn changed the tide of the entire war). Marlborough had not broken the constraints of 18th century warfare but had stretched its limits to an unprecedented level.
On the 10th of June (during the march), Marlborough met with Eugene for the first time. Their relationship, despite contrasting personalities, was extremely strong from the start and their friendship shaped coming events. Together they drew up the plans for the coming campaign.
Eugene was to use his 28,000 men to shadow the French on the Rhine and prevent reinforcements from reaching Bavaria. Meanwhile Marlborough would join his forces with those of Louis of Baden and attempt to bring the Franco-Bavarian forces to battle.
The combined forces of Marlborough and Louis of Baden numbered some 80,000 men, drastically outnumbering the 40,000 men of Elector Maximilian and the Count of Marsin. The two commanders thus decided to try to hold out until French reinforcements under Tallard could reach them.
The Franco-Bavarian forces chose the large town of Dillingen as their fortified base, which was practically unassailable without siege artillery (which Marlborough didn’t have). After uniting with Baden, Marlborough needed to cross the Danube to confront Maximilian and Marsin.
The most logical crossing point was the walled town of Donauwörth. Once Maximilian realized Marlborough’s destination, he rushed his subordinate, the Count d’Arco, and a mixed force of about 10,000 French and Bavarian soldiers (Maximilian’s finest) to Donauwörth.
These forces reached the town before Marlborough and began to strengthen the old defenses of the nearby Schellenberg heights. Marlborough also received news from Eugene that 35,000 French soldiers under Tallard were marching through the Black Forest and into Bavaria.
Marlborough therefore decided he didn’t have time for a siege and that an immediate and direct assault was necessary, and on July 2nd 22,000 Allied soldiers launched their attack on the western face of the heights where the defenses were weakest.
British and Dutch attacks were twice repulsed by murderous Franco-Bavarian musket fire and grenades, with many Allied officers falling at the head of their formations. These repulsed attacks did, however, draw soldiers from the Franco-Bavarian left.
While the British and Dutch soldiers were embroiled with the Franco-Bavarian right, Imperial columns under Baden were able to smash through the Franco-Bavarian left and roll up their flank. Once the Franco-Bavarian line was overwhelmed in one section the rest was doomed.
The remnants of the Franco-Bavarian force fled over the Danube with Allied cavalry hot on their heels. Few regiments withdrew in good order. Casualties on both sides were horrific, with the Allies suffering 5,000 casualties and the Franco-Bavarian forces suffering near 8,000.
These casualties irreparably damaged the Bavarian army, which had lost many of its finest regiments and officers in the struggle. The strategic implications for Bavaria were similarly dire; Maximilian was forced to move behind the fortifications of Augsburg and remain inactive.
Meanwhile, Eugene was doing his best to tie down French reinforcements. He could not necessarily engage Tallard due to the nearby presence of Villeroy’s army. If he dedicated his entire contingent to facing either army, the other would be free to march to Augsburg.
With Tallard coming ever closer to Maximilian, Eugene finally decided to leave 12,000 men at the Lines of Stollhofen to contain Villeroy and marched around 16,000 men to attempt to stall Tallard for as long as possible while Marlborough attempted to bring Maximilian to battle.
In order to bring Maximilian to battle, Marlborough settled on a brutal policy of raiding and pillaging in Bavaria. Maximilian moved some troops to important towns but otherwise refused to leave the protection of Augsburg. Marlborough besieged Rain but could do little else.
While Eugene did not have enough men to engage Tallard’s 35,000 men, Tallard’s progress was being slowed due to the rough terrain of the Black Forest and hostility of local peasants, who, angered by previous French plundering, killed several hundred French stragglers.
These issues were compounded by French horses coming down with glanders, weakening or killing many of them. Nonetheless, Tallard reached Augsburg on the 5th of August. The main Franco-Bavarian army now numbered some 56,000 men, with further detachments spread across Bavaria.
Eugene gradually fell back in front of the combined Franco-Bavarian army and sent messages urging Marlborough to abandon the siege of Rain and join him near Donawurth with all speed. Marlborough immediately responded and gathered his soldiers to march to Eugene’s aid.
However, Marlborough sent Louis of Baden with 15,000 men to siege Ingolstadt, which would secure a second crossing across the Danube. This would have been invaluable if Donawurth had fallen (and had the added bonus of getting the overly cautious Louis of Baden out of the way).
While Tallard had preached caution in the Franco-Bavarian camp, Maximilian and Marsin wished to immediately attack Eugene’s smaller force before Marlborough arrived. Eugene deftly dodged out of the reach of the Franco-Bavarian army, giving Marlborough time to reach him.
By the 11th of August, after hard marching on Marlborough’s part, the Allied army was united. Marlborough had 52,000 men with which to face 56,000. Most commanders would have assumed a defensive posture against such a force, but Marlborough was not most commanders.
Sorry to leave you all on a cliffhanger, but I am going to be covering the Battle of Blenheim in a separate thread (which is even longer than this one). Hopefully it will come out later today (maybe tomorrow but we’ll see). I will post a link below when it is out.
