I admire @jessicadrun beyond anything. Her piece raises urgent questions:

1. What might the impact be if Taiwan is perceived as a partisan cause?

2. How can we close gaps in understanding between Taiwanese, diaspora & those in US policy & academia? 1/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/13/taiwan-contact-guidelines-pompeo-partisan-china/
Jessica posits in a "hyperpartisan environment there is a real risk in associating support for Taiwan with Republicans". What might those risks be? Maybe nothing in terms of arms sales & economic policies, where all US admins act in what they think to be *their* best interest 2/
But over the last few months I've been trying (with my limited ability) to communicate with Taiwanese people why it matters if *they* are perceived at this moment to be hyperpartisan. How could their views or behavior have an impact on anything as lofty as US foreign policy? 3/
Taiwan faces existential crisis that could potentially turn imminent at any time. This shapes thinking towards immediate gain & protection. The longer-term work of nurturing foreign knowledge of & interest in Taiwan beyond selling arms is thus often dismissed as irrelevant 4/
There is far too little knowledge here about all the different forms that support for Taiwan takes abroad & the pathways by which foreigners come to care for this place - that it's precisely because Taiwan lacks formal state recognition that informal support matters so much. 5/
Taiwan needs ordinary people who will call their legislators to keep pro-Taiwan bills on a busy agenda. It needs ordinary people to come study here & then go on & work in foreign governments, NGOs, media, universities etc., advancing Taiwan's cause across a myriad of platforms 6/
Perception of Taiwan is everything. Taiwan already is independent; it just isn't perceived this way. Taiwanese associating themselves with a hyper-controversial foreign politician is the opposite of building consensus around Taiwan's geopolitical status 7/ https://twitter.com/catielila/status/1348808526966059009?s=20
Over the last few months I've observed: Taiwanese being awash in disinformation about the US election; producing commentary that therefore reads to foreign observers as hyperpartisan in an off-putting way; & then arguing that foreigners are misinterpreting Taiwanese concerns 8/
There's often a gap between what Taiwanese & what foreign observers & policymakers think is good for Taiwan. But this is the *relational* aspect of "foreign relations". Building connections, keeping people's interest in Taiwan requires considering what will appeal to *others* 9/
I take @bikhim at her word on @SecPompeo's recent announcements. At the same time I think articles like Jessica's are an opportunity for Taiwanese to consider how hyper-partisanship reads to a wider circle of analysts & officials in Washington DC. 10/ https://twitter.com/bikhim/status/1348012430530641920?s=20
Taiwan needs to prepare itself for a generational shift in the US & to strategize long-term. To recognize disinformation from Epoch Times & even mainstream Taiwanese outlets is out of step w/what many younger Americans working in politics, policy, academia & the media think. 11/
Three cheers for @cptwei & other Taiwanese accounts that are reaching out to their peers to deliver this crucial message: "The most damaging circumstance for Taiwanese is to drag US policy towards Taiwan into the quagmire of partisan ideology." 12/ https://twitter.com/cptwei/status/1348515213813850114
Finally, every post that people here use to support Trump himself is a chance lost to focus attention instead on why Americans (and everyone else!) should support Taiwan.

Trump personally does not need anyone's support anymore.

But Taiwan does. 13/ https://twitter.com/PLMattis/status/1349541836537417731?s=20
You can follow @catielila.
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