THREAD > the SEA section of the strategy doc is laughably thin and divorced from the reality of the last 4 years. That's been covered. So let's talk about what exactly it would've meant to "highlight ASEAN centrality as a core component of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific." Anyone? https://twitter.com/EvanLaksmana/status/1349173945774317568

Sure, showing up to ASEAN summits, appointing ambassadors (incl. to the Secretariat), and talking about things that SEA actually cares about would've been helpful. But once you do that (a la Obama admin) how do you operationalize a strategy based primarily on ASEAN centrality?

Most SEA states don't pursue a regional policy based on ASEAN centrality themselves b/c they recognize it as impossible. Let's call it the "Cambodia problem" though it isn't just Cambodia. ASEAN lacks consensus on any sensitive security or economic issue and therefore can't act.

Vietnamese elites report more faith in the Quad than ASEAN. Both Aquino & Duterte have been publicly dismissive of the group's efficacy, albeit for different reasons. Even Indonesia, the seat of the Secretariat, can barely convince its president to engage in ASEAN summitry.

This doesn't mean ASEAN isn't important: it is vital for public diplomacy and norm setting. And it's the best long-term bet for regional architecture. But that's a LONG-TERM bet. What are states supposed to do about sensitive issues NOW?

ASEAN centrality should NOT be circumvented on those issues where ASEAN is able and willing to be central. But those generally don't include some really vital security, political, and economic issues, or basically anything that might upset Beijing.

So any rationale and effective strategy must be dual-track: support ASEAN centrality where feasible. But invest at least as much, arguably more, in bilateral & minilateral relationships w/ individual member-states on the most sensitive (and important) issues of the day.

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