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A list of questions about the 1/6 siege: a thread. About motives, planning, and operations.
Did members of Congress or their staff unwittingly take participants in the riot on private tours before the rally? If so, and after the tours, did any of them have reason to think that these tours would be used in service of a seditious act?
Did these private tours (if they happened) bring participants by leadership offices? Did the participants request to see certain Democratic offices? Did they gain access?
During the hour snd a half that President Trump was watching the insurrection in real time, did he explicitly say no to a request for National Guard troops?
Did Acting SecDef Miller speak with the President during this period? Did Trump convey disapproval tacitly? Was he in communication with any outside advisers during this period?
Did Trump’s staff believe he was refusing to put out a statement because Trump generally thought he would succeed?
Before 1/6, what was the extent of any contact between any member of Congress or their staff, and anyone in the administration and their staff, with anyone who was arrested (or will be arrested)?
If it’s true that the Secretary of the Army had full powers to employ the DCNG, why would be need to bump the request to employ the force up to the SecDef? Isn’t alacrity the point of predelegation?
Did the Secret Service send reinforcements to protect VP Pence in the Capitol hard room?
The DOD seems to suggest that 40 minutes elapsed from the request for NG activation until the troops received a FRAGO (basically, an order to mobilize.). What accounts for this 40 minutes? Who worked the request?
Why didn’t the NMCC initiate action on its own as soon as continuity of operations procedures were initiated for the Congressional leadership?
Why aren’t there plans for every member of congress to be evacuated to the COOP site in DC? Flying them off to a faraway bunker is impractical but evacuating them from a besieged target would seem to be a priority?
Has inter-branch tension over continuity of government and umbrella plans for three branches made it hard to conceive of totalizing events like this?
Does the USCP, USSS or any other entity in the NCR have a specific counter-targeting group that feeds recommendations into plans and SOPs?
Have MPD and the USCP ever exercised a joint operation to clear a Capitol that has been taken over by insurgents while members of Congress were present?
Is communication interoperable?
How many command centers were working this? Who was in charge, and when? Was there an incident commander assigned? Did that commander have full operational control over all the assets?
Why doesn’t the USCP have tactical non-lethal crowd control technology (like Shockwave) devices)?
What did Rep. Dan Crenshaw perceive his “special mission” to be? What was the desired effect?
Why didn’t the FBI warn Republican members of Congress that there was significant online violent aspirational rhetoric linked to the Stop the Steal campaign? As in - “Stop saying it because it’s being used to amplify aspirational calls to violence?”
Why weren’t tactical teams assigned to the inner perimeter? (Only one, the team assigned to Pence, seems to have been there. The rest arrived well into the insurrection behind the protestors and were tasked with rescuing colleagues.).
By “unwittingly” in question one I also mean to say (as you move down the line of questions) that were there staff or members who knew in advance that the chamber might be / would be stormed? If so, did anyone inform USCP
