THREAD/NEW PUBLICATION: We often discuss stabilization/fragile states policy as a distinct issue from geopolitical competition. US interagency discussions on those two imperatives usually occur on totally different tracks. 1/

We sometimes hear that "since we're now doing great power competition, and we're done with stabilization." My colleague @daphnemccurdy & I believe that's a flawed take. Geopolitical comp happens somewhere, and increasingly, that's in fragile states: in Africa, MidEast, etc. 2/

But more needs to be known about whether and how stabilization assistance can be harnessed as a tool of US power in the context of geopolitical competition. In this new brief for @csis_isp , we use eastern Syria as a case study to examine this question. https://www.csis.org/analysis/stabilization-assistance-amid-geopolitical-competition-case-study-eastern-syria

Key takeaways: 1. Effectively harnessing stabilization assistance in the context of geopolitical comp would require a persistent, dependable on-the-ground U.S. civilian presence. 4/

2. For stabilization assistance to be effective in achieving gray-zone competition objectives, a long-term, seriously conveyed U.S. commitment to supporting legitimate governing authorities is necessary. 5/

3. Using civilian stabilization assistance for geopolitical competition ushers in deep moral dilemmas. 6/

4. Senior policymakers must acknowledge and adjudicate tensions between geopolitical competition and stabilization objectives when they arise. 7/

5. Partnering with non-state actors presents new complications to pursuing a viable political end state, which is critical for stabilization assistance to be effective. END

cc @CarnegieDCG @SaskiaBrech @JarrettBlanc @SchneidermanDM @Smartwomen @myacoubian @CarnegieEndow @meganfdoherty @ErolYayboke