I believe that one of the reasons of this difference in perception between scientists and philosophers boils down to the fact that scientists usually dive into philosophy of science in search of a normative description of what is and what is not (good) science 1/3 https://twitter.com/lakens/status/1341689088756297729

The normative issue (i.e. a logical reconstruction of Science) was Popper’s goal (preceded by the Wiener kreis and followed, to some extent, by Lakatos, among many others) and falsificationism (especially in its amended form), conjectures and refutations set clear benchmarks

However, it seems to me that a lot of contemporary philosophy of science is strongly influenced by Kuhn and Feyerabend whose historiographic and ‘anarchist’ views, although very insightful, are, ultimately descriptive and of little ‘practical’ use for the scientists