2/7

and frictionless capital flows require a completely different approach to trade than 100-200 years ago.

The first two conditions render bilateral trade relationships almost irrelevant in determining who runs surpluses and who runs deficits, and the third condition...
3/7

means that trade imbalances are driven by capital flow imbalances. While Peter Navarro’s approach would probably have borne results 100 years ago, even by fifty years ago they were already obsolete, and today do little more than temporarily distort production markets...
4/7

while having little impact on underlying trade imbalances anywhere.

Persistent surpluses are always caused by distortions in the distribution of domestic income in the surplus country that artificially forces up the savings rate. Deficits in countries like the US and...
5/7

the UK, or in peripheral Europe before 2008-9, are almost always the result of the willingness and ability of their financial systems to absorb those excess savings.

Washington should certainly continue implementing policies that aim to reduce the US deficit: persistent...
6/7

US deficits exacerbate income inequality and force up debt while putting upward pressure on unemployment. But it should wholly abandon the policies preferred by the Trump administration. As I have argued since they were first proposed, and... https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691158686/the-great-rebalancing
7/7

also in my 2013 and 2020 books, all they could do at best was temporarily distort bilateral imbalances without affecting in any meaningful the overall US deficit or the overall Chinese surplus.

https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300244175/trade-wars-are-class-wars
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