During #SWW the US Army grappled with how best to respond to and, if possible, prevent the proliferation of “psychiatric casualties” in combat units. The “intensity and duration”of a soldier’s exposure to the strains of battle amplified each experience and contributed to his loss

A wartime analysis of US infantry casualties in the North African theater yielded stark findings: infantry battalions were found to suffer “neuropsychiatric casualty rates of 1200 to 1500 per 1000 strength per year,” as opposed to other branches with losses of 20 or 30 per 1000.

In sum, “15 to 20 percent of the total nonfatal combat casualties (NP plus WIA) were neuropsychiatric.” The US Army’s North African experience showed that all non-disabling wounds in inf bns were neuropsychiatric, an issue that troubled army leadership.

“Just as an average truck wears out after a certain number of miles it appears that the doughboy wore out, either developing an acute incapacitating neurosis or else becoming hypersensitive to shell fire...

...so overly cautious and jittery that he was ineffective and demoralizing to newer men.”Such incapacitation was estimated to occur after a period of”200 to 240 regimental combat days.” Casualties with more than 200 regimental combat days required “at least” six mos recuperation.

The US Army noted with approval the British practice of removing infantry from the life after 12 days for a 4 days’ rest. British authorities claimed that this increased the effectiveness of their inf to 400 regimental combat days.

In Italy, GI’s saw more than 20 days continuous front line service, with some extreme cases exceeding 80 days. It was found that too much was being required of US infantry for too long a period of exposure. A lack of “incentives” was identified as a source of the problem.

An infantryman’s resentment of the policy that kept men in the line until they became “worthless” was identified as a major inflection point, leading to a gradual erosion of morale and feeding conflicts between the infantry and base area personnel.

Beyond this, there existed serious concern that the GI was not sufficiently concerned with the stakes involved in the global conflict: “In itself, winning the war is unimportant to the American soldier.” This theme is a major source of concern and the page below worth reading.

The introduction of specific combat tours, “rewards of achievement,” as well as both tactical and strategic orientation for the ground soldier was recommended as possible solutions to forestall combat breakdown and improve morale and combat effectiveness.

As strategic orientation played into the “why we fight” narrative—and the belief that the German soldier had a more compelling sense of his role in the war via National Socialist indoctrination and a culture that venerated the soldier—this is viewed as the “easier” to resolve.

Over all, it is a fascinating subject and the availability of similar reports from all theaters of war show that it was a subject that the US Army took seriously, if not always with a serious grasp of the science behind it.

#WWII #SWW