1. This is absolutely right. Let them move to a platform where there is little potential for new recruits, unlikelihood of random people stumbling on propaganda, of random people being able to DM people in the movement and getting roped in. https://twitter.com/intelwire/status/1348747157482954754
2. (Of all the ISIS fighters and supporters I have interviewed, it was rarely about the propaganda alone. It was their ability to literally DM and become friends with someone in Syria/Iraq that was important. Twitter in 2013/14 was a big playground in that sense).
3. Once in a while, do a suspension campaign, especially of dangerous content like bomb making instructions. They spend time coming back, bragging to themselves about how they can’t be stopped etc. Makes them feel cool.
4. I wrote about this a bit after the November 2019 campaign against ISIS. Here: https://www.google.ca/amp/s/www.vice.com/amp/en/article/vb55bd/telegram-deplatforming-isis-has-given-them-something-to-fight-for
5. In the meantime, you learn who the main disseminators are, and which channels are important in the process.
6. If the campaigns are too ruthless, they will innovate, migrate, etc.
Even here, you can also learn quite a bit about what innovation looks like. What do these groups do when put under pressure? All important information.
Even here, you can also learn quite a bit about what innovation looks like. What do these groups do when put under pressure? All important information.
7. @MoustafaAyad’s research is important in this regard. https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/the-propaganda-pipeline-the-isis-fuouaris-upload-network-on-facebook/
8/8. This is a major turning point for the far-right online. I’m very curious to see what happens next.