It can’t be said that there is no foreign policy debate in the U.K. beyond Brexit anymore. With the launch of a new @ChathamHouse report by its director @RobinNiblett there are now two distinct visions emerging. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/01/global-britain-global-broker
First the @ChathamHouse version. Here the U.K. is urged to be a global problem solver and remain closely in sync to the EU in foreign policy. It’s a foreign policy vision with at its heart the idea of a sharp elbowed but ultimately collaborative world. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jan/11/brexit-uk-should-aim-to-be-a-global-broker-not-a-great-power-says-report
Next the @Policy_Exchange vision. Here the U.K. is urged to tilt its foreign policy and hard power towards the Indo-Pacific in the context of a rising China. It’s a vision foreign policy vision with at its heart great power competition with Beijing. https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/politics/2020/nov/22/uk-should-tilt-foreign-policy-to-indo-pacific-region-report-says
One area both visions seem to clash is over India. The more values-first @ChathamHouse vision argues for the U.K. not to over invest in India, due to creeping authoritarianism, whereas the realist @Policy_Exchange vision wants a deeper focus due to China competition.
The India question is particularly relevant as Johnson was planning a major trip to India, is inviting to form the D-10 and the U.K. is engaging in big vaccine diplomacy there: a hint at how London might want to use India diversity Chinese supply chains. https://twitter.com/dominicraab/status/1345656552146001921?s=21 https://twitter.com/dominicraab/status/1345656552146001921
Both the @ChathamHouse and @Policy_Exchange reports are excellent and leave a healthy tension to the UK foreign policy debate. I’m left with two questions that won’t go away. Is the first underestimating how the world has changed. Is the second overestimating Britain’s capacity?