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On Saturday, the @CDU will choose its new party leader. What will we learn from the choice for the CDU's - and probably by extension 
's - future approach to 
?
Not that much: Whoever wins will inherit a party that is fundamentally unsure what to make of Europe.
Thread:
's - future approach to ? Not that much: Whoever wins will inherit a party that is fundamentally unsure what to make of Europe.
Thread:
1/ For the last 15 years, the CDU has been the most important veto player in European policymaking. When the CDU moves, Europe moves. When the CDU does not, neither does Europe. And barring a surprise in the September elections and a centre-left govt, this will remain the case.
2/ Decisions were always taken in concert by the two main actors: The govt and the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, which yields extraordinary power in EU policy, in particular when it comes to all things financial. In fact, the parliamentary group is the real veto player here.
3/ Now, all three candidates have strongly emphasised their commitment to "Europe" during the campaign but have carefully avoided taking any stance on any future hot topic. Still, we can detect nuances, e.g. when looking at the candidates' position on the recovery fund:
4/ While @n_roettgen pretty early on showed openness to pragmatic solutions, @_FriedrichMerz was a staunch opponent of common bonds. Yet, once Merkel and Macron presented their proposal, the whole CDU including the candidates quickly supported it.
5/ Still, Merz continued to "ask questions" about the legality of the proposal (his favourite dogwhistling technique) while both Röttgen and @ArminLaschet defended the Recovery Instrument without reservation. But both were also careful not to discuss implications for the future.
6/ Based on this episode and statements on other EU policy matters, it seems that Röttgen would be the most open to more common EU action including more pooling of sovereignty; Merz the most sceptical; and Laschet as somewhere in the middle.
7/ What would that mean in practice? Whoever wins will inherit a party that is fundamentally unsure of its position on Europe. It tells itself time and again that it is the "Europe party", and that is historically absolutely correct. But it has lost its grip on what that means.
8/ Since the euro crisis, many in the party and particular on the Bundestag's back benches have become deeply distrustful of EU institutions and other member states. Hence why Merkel was so careful not to take any risks on EU matters she did not see as absolutely necessary.
9/ This has been a primary driver of the reactiveness and defensiveness of German EU policy in recent years. If that is to change as long as the CDU is in power, e.g. in favor of a proactive German EU strategy, the CDU needs a new grip on what it wants the EU to become.
10/ To get there, it would need a party leadership that can formulate clear positions also in the more uncomfortable areas (What about Fidesz? What is truly our idea on the EU's financial architecture?) and can build majorities for these positions within the party.
11/ But most likely, no candidate will win decisively and will have the kind of political capital to reformulate the CDU's position on Europe, let alone in an election year. Hence the party will likely remain unsure what it wants on Europe heading into coalition talks.
12/ This is all the more true as differences on European issues were just not an important point of distinction in this very slow and largely void-of-substance leadership race; so whoever wins will not be able to claim a policy mandate in either direction.
13/ So of course this race matters tremendously. The positions and attitudes - on Europe as well as many other issues - of a possible next German chancellor can make a huge difference for better or for worse. But the party will still be the same.
