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Assumptions about the robustness of the Capitol Police initial deployment and response to the violence on Wednesday need pushback, both in how we understand this particular event to prepare for the immediate future, AND for dealing with RWE in the longer term.
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Critiques of the choices Capitol Police made ignore the truth in this event as in war: the solutions were always going to be found in and constrained by the political level. Given the political sanction for this event, the broader movement and its constituent groups, as --
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-- well as their activities over the summer, a more aggressive approach was as likely to provoke further violence as control events. The terms of the electoral contest have been drawn too starkly for this group to have been easily deterred. (And certainly the social media --
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-- chatter before, during, and after, plus the many snippets of audio from the events themselves suggest that at least a significant cadre had strategic ambitions should the opportunity arise.)
What have their activities suggested was possible?
We should absolutely --
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What have their activities suggested was possible?
We should absolutely --
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-- expect to find that there were armed auxiliaries tucked away near and over the state borders, capable of swarming the Capitol. (I would put good money on mobile data revealing a menacing disposition of "reinforcements".) Remember the Summer of the Truck? Now imagine --
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-- that as training. And consider its application in a combined arms doctrine for urban chaos ops. (I will remind you of the 1919 TransCon Convoy.) Remember the Garden State Parkway? More training. Give a thought to how sufficient blockages would have affected the ability --
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-- to support DC. Further afield, there are waterways that run in close proximity to the critical terrain, so I can't help thinking about those boat rallies and what that might portend. (Who has forgotten Mumbai?)
Notwithstanding legitimate discussions regarding race and --
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Notwithstanding legitimate discussions regarding race and --
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-- recent protests, whether the Capitol Police leadership were derelict in planning or worse, there is a long history of LE taking a lighter approach to white supremacist and nationalist extremists, because of risks of escalation in the moment, and broader political --
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-- responses in the longer term - because we simply cannot ignore the privileged place white supremacist extremism has enjoyed in the post Civil War era from America's Southern and conservative political elites, national and local. The difference in their activities has --
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-- always been determined by the degree to which the public sanctions overt political support of this sentiment. (Just look at the trajectory of the KKK that morphed into the modern militia movement, as they ebb and flow according to political cover.)
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And this brings us to the crux of where we are. Right Wing Extremism must be addressed at the political level. It can only be constrained in the US when politicians withdraw their support. The movement will not be defeated in battle. Especially not when it is --
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-- augmented, as it is now, with an even broader base capable of providing mass manpower to their events and a political voice to their efforts. (This is where Trump has been especially dangerous, in fully mobilizing a large segment of the public to their cause.)
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-- What does this mean about how I understand Wednesday? To a degree, it is probably better that the police response was only just sufficient to protect what was vital. The risk of escalation and what might have followed as a consequence of that is far, far worse than --
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-- what we saw, both in terms of physical destruction and political consequences. I simply don't see a tactical plan, or ensuing support of forces, that offers mitigation against escalation. To avoid the crisis, the only option was to remove proceedings to an alternative --
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-- location. Because what POTUS and the elite GOP emboldened was not going to be muzzled and controlled in that moment.
And as Republicans still largely refuse to disavow the lies inflaming the movement and the actors and organizers driving conflict, the threat and --
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And as Republicans still largely refuse to disavow the lies inflaming the movement and the actors and organizers driving conflict, the threat and --
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-- risk from these actors will remain significant.
This means that for the foreseeable future (3-6 months), absent a change in heart from the Republican Party, we should expect more and more violent, incidents. This has serious implications for the inauguration and --
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This means that for the foreseeable future (3-6 months), absent a change in heart from the Republican Party, we should expect more and more violent, incidents. This has serious implications for the inauguration and --
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-- whether it is really advisable to take a tactical solutionist approach.
Over the long term, we need to fully reckon this is at the political level, not the tactical, because every advance by security forces will produce asymmetric responses so long as --
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Over the long term, we need to fully reckon this is at the political level, not the tactical, because every advance by security forces will produce asymmetric responses so long as --
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-- political support remains.
As in war, so too in domestic conflict.
-Fin-
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As in war, so too in domestic conflict.
-Fin-
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I'm going to append tweets and links relevant to this thread...
Think about the level of force necessary to counter the extremes of rage we saw. Perhaps not all, but many were in this state.
Example: the murder of Officer Sicknick. https://twitter.com/GreggFavre/status/1348275257132638210?s=19
Think about the level of force necessary to counter the extremes of rage we saw. Perhaps not all, but many were in this state.
Example: the murder of Officer Sicknick. https://twitter.com/GreggFavre/status/1348275257132638210?s=19
