German-US relations are likely getting into a very critical phase with respect to China. Growing divergence of interests and perspectives will make the transatlantic revival many still hope for difficult to realize.
A new poll shows that 77% of Germans prefer their government to stay neutral when it comes to a Chinese-US conflict according to @welt https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article224044718/Wunsch-nach-Neutralitaet-Nur-17-Prozent-der-Deutschen-fuer-Unterstuetzung-der-USA-bei-Konflikt-mit-China.html
Such questions would also becoming an issue with respect to growing war threats against #Taiwan https://twitter.com/MPWangTingyu/status/1307219030445445122
The German foreign ministry's policy guidelines for the #IndoPacific argue for "closing ranks with democracies" but don't address the issue of Taiwan once
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380514/f9784f7e3b3fa1bd7c5446d274a4169e/200901-indo-pazifik-leitlinien--1--data.pdf
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380514/f9784f7e3b3fa1bd7c5446d274a4169e/200901-indo-pazifik-leitlinien--1--data.pdf
Big German companies meanwhile fully bet on the Chinese market https://twitter.com/AMFChina/status/1347530233034006529 and have no plans to divest and diversify.
German companies move towards deeper integration into various Chinese digital infrastructures with all subsequent legal and political liabilities https://www.aicgs.org/2020/12/europes-digital-autonomy-and-potentials-of-a-u-s-german-alignment-toward-china/
How Germany and the EU will be able and willing to balance between a China as "simultaneously a cooperation partner, a negotiation partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival" https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/external-investment-plan/34728/eu-china-relations-factsheet_en remains to be seen.