Used to work on the violent right-wing extremist threat back in the day (2008-11). Here are the big changes I'm noticing compared to then, left handed crayon-on-napkin edition: [thread] https://twitter.com/WylieNewmark/status/1347677403808555008

1/ Structure: Lots more factions now, but diff b/tw them blurrier. Militia, Klan-types, NeoNazis, Christian ID, etc used to be pretty distinct if not mutually antagonistic. Now they seem to borrow from one another, with main differences less ideological vs about strategy/tactics

2/ Major Insider Threat: Way more infiltration of public institutions now vs then, especially of police forces. Always an ebb & flow, but feels like the scale is unprecedented now, as is how openly its done (and acted on)

3/ Distributed geography: RW extremists used to be relatively localized often in identifiable hotspots. Now a nationwide and even globalized movement, with broad based fundraising and media.

4/ Demographic: More middle class and wealthier now, despite most media narratives

5/ Political Strategy: Success in aligning extremist goals with popular political grievances + ambitions of opportunistic right wing politicians really incredible vs fragmented underground of yore. On par IMO with political strategy of 1920s KKK when it had 2 million members

5/ Tactical Evolution: Vs before, seems now less focus on terroristic tactics (bombings, murders) & more on fascistic ones (individual & mass intimidation - verbal and physical, co-opting tools of state violence, etc). ie who needs Leaderless Resistance when you got Parler & cops

Therefore responses probably need to include:
1. Comprehensively re-mapping the whole right wing extremist landscape. Given the above, prob should be done by the IC (not LE) and the results declassified and made public. Use all tools available.

2. Need to be relentless in rooting out the insider threat, esp in police. Just like the Army had to do in the 90s. Not a legal expert, but probably can be done with existing laws and tools.

3. Aggressively discredit foreign influences / sever international relationships. Some strategic FTO or SDN designations of foreign (NOT domestic) right-wing extremists as FTOs would probably open up a lot of targeting opportunities without too much blowback risk.

4. Take Blowback risk seriously: Need to be ruthless but focus pressure on group leaders and critical middle echelons, not rank-and-file. GWOT shows blowback is a serious risk if response is not targeted and too ham/heavy handed. Even more acute given this is domestic