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We may have one of the most important declarations from North Korea on its planned qualitative nuclear modernization in some time. Stand by for more soon.
KCNA direct links not working well, but you can find the text on the home page http://kcna.kp as usual.
On nuclear forces and missile force modernization, talk of:
- longer-range missiles
- better missiles
- hypersonic missile
- military reconnaissance satellites
- solid-fuel ICBMs
- new UAVs
- new nuclear warheads
- tactical nuclear weapons
- longer-range missiles
- better missiles
- hypersonic missile
- military reconnaissance satellites
- solid-fuel ICBMs
- new UAVs
- new nuclear warheads
- tactical nuclear weapons
Some translations of the primary Korean text here from @nknewsorg (these are unofficial; KCNA's English translation will likely take a while with a text of this length). https://twitter.com/nknewsorg/status/1347658766469066752
"전술핵무기" is pretty unambiguously "tactical nuclear weapon," which is a big deal. Would likely imply a return to nuclear testing. Kim has no shortage of suitable delivery systems, including the 2019-2020 systems (KN23, KN24, KN25).
And a small note: it's still Kim Jong Un's (likely) 37th birthday here in the United States (January 8).
We're basically getting a peek at the Academy of National Defense Science and NK munitions industry's full R&D agenda from 2017 onward. This could also presage a new 2013-2017-style set of testing campaigns, however.
There's also a specific call to develop ICBMs capable of ranging 15,000 kilometers, which may explain part of the rationale for the 11-axle ICBM seen in October.
In an inter-Korean context, much of this comes off as North Korea's response to South Korea's 2021-2025 Intermediate-Term National Defense Plan.
In terms of "How surprising is this?," my answer is "Not very." In my book, I discuss many of the very things North Korea announced today as logical areas for investment given what we know about Kim's nuclear strategy preferences.
Moving to tactical nuclear weapons, IMO, is the most concerning to me from a stability and safety perspective. If pursued, I would expect concomitant changes in how North Korea operationalizes NC3.
A (speculative) note: open interest in TNWs could tell us a thing or two about how much fizmat they've amassed. The crudest TNW designs are generally fizmat-inefficient, so would imply large stores of HEU for strategic & TNW needs. https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1347673425335226370
On UAVs, the work report calls for a range of 500 kilometer, which would cover most of South Korea. AFAICT, no specific mention of loitering munitions (all the rage after the Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020).
<THREAD> Just got the KCNA English translation of the 4th day work report at the 8th Party Congress. Follow along if you're interested in how North Korea described some of its modernization plans.
Note before we start: most of the past tense descriptions describe accomplishments since the 7th Party Congress in May 2016.
"The super-large MLRS, a super-power attack weapon never to be seen in the world history of weapons, was developed in the field of national defence science, which was followed by the development of ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons"
MIRVs: "The report also noted that in the period under review the field of national defense scientific research has conducted the research for perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket at the final stage"
Significant: "...national defense scientific research has ... finished the research into development of warheads of different combat missions including the supersonic gliding flight warheads for new type ballistic rockets and is making preparations for their test and production"
Incredibly fascinating: for the first time, Kim reveals that North Korea was conducting work into naval nuclear propulsion from submarines (something I revealed in my book). Also implies that the July 2018 submarine (Romeo mod) not be an SSB.
On the advantages of becoming a nuclear power: "it upraised the country to the position of a world nuclear power and military power in both name and reality and put an end to the era in which big countries tended to make bargain with the interests of our state and nation."
Reiteration of a consistent justification for nuclear weapons possession by North Korea: nuclear weapons are an enabler of security and, ergo, development. (A bit of a contrast with the dour mood at the first and second day of the Party Congress.)
Interesting (albeit standard) discussion of the external environment and relations with the US & China.
On the new 11-axle ICBM, which remains unnamed here (but analysts have taken to calling it the "Hwasong-16"). Implies that the large payload fairing may be intended for a "more powerful warhead," but MIRVs appear elsewhere (above).
Reflections on the byungjin line.
In case you want the North Korean view on the benefits of the Singapore & Hanoi summits.
The way this report is presented is very much like one would expect to hear about these things in a "normal" nuclear state. It reminds me almost of Putin addressing the Federal Assembly and describing accomplishments/plans. No euphemisms; little reading between the lines.
