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This story has been recounted as newly relevant in the Trump era and represents a potentially constitutionally momentous historical moment. I have seen slightly differing accounts of what actually took place, and the differences are constitutionally significant. https://twitter.com/beschlossdc/status/1325863193923686400
Here is a useful discussion of the Schlesinger - Nixon episode, by former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council. (Not the other James Baker) https://www.justsecurity.org/73221/good-governance-paper-no-21-obedience-to-orders-lawful-orders-and-the-militarys-constitutional-compact/
I discuss SecDef Schlesinger's purported attempt to keep Nixon from abusing military power and the extent to which it actually represented a breakdown in the chain of command or an entirely lawful form of bureaucratic resistance here, starting at p208:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186259
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186259
As I wrote in "Bureaucratic Resistance," "The actual mechanism used—a memo to the services stating that the normal lines of command were to be followed in the event of unusual circumstances—is hardly outside the bounds of the Defense Secretary’s authorities. ..."
"To the contrary, this is exactly the chain of command created by the Secretary of Defense’s, and more generally the Department of Defense’s, statutory authorities ..."
"Ultimately, the circumstances Schlesinger feared—in particular a military order from the President in those last days—never came to pass; thus, we cannot know what Schlesinger would have done were a real conflict to arise."
"Moreover, had such a conflict arisen, the President could simply have dismissed Schlesinger (and based on what we know, probably would have), and then faced the political consequences of doing so."
There is a roadmap in here for lawful bureaucratic resistance, EVEN by the Secdef and others within the chain of command, though they are most constrained--and for good reason. But asking questions, even pushing back on the President's requests does not a military coup make.
We have seen this at work, in some cases publicly, under Trump. There may have been some lawful resistance at play in Secdef Miller's decision, under his authority, to send in the national guard without first running it by the President, for fear he might say no.
Recall that the President can issue orders down the chain of command, and that he can fire his Secretary of Defense if he chooses. In the interim, if they choose to question his decisions, or take actions within the bounds of their authority, that is not a constitutional crisis.
These concerns re the parameters of a constitutional crisis are focused mainly at what DOD might do in response to lawful or plausibly lawful orders. It is always permissible to refuse an *unlawful* order. Under normal circumstances, that defense is rarely successful, but
these are not normal circumstances.
