

I choose not to believe the USA is incapacitated by what happened on 6 Jan 2021 & the last 4 years.
But what kind of world are we in if it turns out to be? /1.
Answer: it looks a lot like the run up to 1914. And the next 30 years. Only worse.
Then as now there was no multi-national (or multilateral) global governance system or power structure capable of keeping order, or even just reliably, consistently enforcing its own will./2.
Then as now there was no multi-national (or multilateral) global governance system or power structure capable of keeping order, or even just reliably, consistently enforcing its own will./2.
Then as now, the world was so highly interconnected by the extraordinary power of ever more advanced, industrial era technologies & the associated ability to deploy vast energy resources to create wealth & project military force, that only an undisputed, global power could .../3.
... prevent the worldwide chaos which otherwise arises out of competing, strong but not dominant, entities. Considering these factors together, unless & until, perhaps, a truly effective global governance capability might one day be created (I’m not holding my breath), .../4.
... the power & its ordering force can only come - if at all - from a single, concerted political entity. Essentially, a hegemonic nation. That used to be Britain. The first ever global hegemon. With its unprecedented technological & energy dominance. /5.
When that couldn’t be sustained (technologies & energy exploitation spread, allowing others to gain economic & military might, eroding Britain’s relative - & therefore real - power, even as its absolute wealth increased ever further) there was no alternative hegemon available./6.
Chaos ensued. For three decades. At the end of which, the USA was (finally) able - & willing - to assert that role, the only political entity which was even close to being capable of doing so. /7.
Which, in turn, was itself a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for its ability to carry out the role. (The USSR, seen from the hegemon’s perspective, was a disruptive & dangerous power to be contained - as the US leadership understood. Not a realistic competitor. /8.
Its acquisition of nuclear weapons, combined with its ideological stance did, however, make it a potentially existential threat).
Where are we now?
China is very far from being able to take on a hegemonic position. So, for some similar & some different reasons, is the EU. /9.
Where are we now?
China is very far from being able to take on a hegemonic position. So, for some similar & some different reasons, is the EU. /9.
There are no other candidates even worth considering long enough to get to the point of summarily rejecting their candidacy.
(Chinese economic & military might & geographic scope are significant but insufficient. So is, these days, the USA’s economic weight./10.
(Chinese economic & military might & geographic scope are significant but insufficient. So is, these days, the USA’s economic weight./10.
(The same is true for the EU). But the hitherto highly effective, global American alliance, notably its transatlantic & Asia-Pacific components, has long enabled the USA to multiply its purely national weight, the relative magnitude of which was substantially greater .../11.
... in 1950 than it is now. The Chinese leadership well understands the point &, since about 1980, has been pursuing what amounts to a 100-year strategy fundamentally to change the position, to China’s advantage). /12.
Even if there were a ready made hegemon in waiting, the transitional strains of shifting from the existing order to a future one would be so enormous as to be almost certainly unmanageable. In fact we would need an established & highly effective world governance structure .../13.
... to have any real chance of navigating them successfully. That could be the USA & its allies handing over the keys to the world early enough to avoid the bear pit into which we would all otherwise fall .../14.
... (essentially a global doomsday version of the Thucydides Trap, described by the eponymous Athenian author in his History Of The Peloponnesian War). But that assumes a lot, none of which is likely to happen & much of which would anyway be exceptionally risky. /15.
Or it could be a multilateral governance arrangement. But that’s a fantasy, for any foreseeable future. In any case, if it existed, why would the keys need to be handed over at all?
We must face the truth. And it’s terrifying. There’s no way around that. /16.
We must face the truth. And it’s terrifying. There’s no way around that. /16.
If the USA, with its alliance, fails, far from a new world order - whether one to our taste, or otherwise - the overwhelming likelihood is chaos similar in nature to 1914-45, but in a thermonuclear armed world, facing a climate catastrophe, & .../17.
... with global public health circumstances so systemically fragile as to be an existential threat in themselves.
What strategic & operational conclusions might we draw?
I’m not to keen on hurtling toward disaster. So here are mine. /18.
What strategic & operational conclusions might we draw?
I’m not to keen on hurtling toward disaster. So here are mine. /18.
The USA and its alliance must not fail.
Anyone doing less than everything in their power to prevent its failure, & to strengthen & improve it, is cheering on Armageddon. Whether they understand that or not. /19.
Anyone doing less than everything in their power to prevent its failure, & to strengthen & improve it, is cheering on Armageddon. Whether they understand that or not. /19.
Trumpism, in its MAGA/ America First form, is so potentially catastrophic because it destroys the heart of American power, the USA itself, while shredding the transatlantic & Asia-Pacific alliances essential to the global reach, effectiveness & sustainability of that power./20.
Trumpism in its mutated, cosmopolitan form, much of which existed before we knew Trumpism was Trumpism, corrodes & emasculates American power wherever its cancerous attack on the vital organs takes hold. /21.
Brexit, for example, perhaps the prime example of cosmopolitan Trumpism, is a malignant growth in the guts of the vital transatlantic alliance. Its great attractiveness to Mr Putin is for precisely that reason. /22.
If the open heart surgery on the USA, which it now falls to Mr Biden & his colleagues to perform, fails, the operations to excise Brexit & other metastasising tumours around the world will be of little use. /23.
Equally, if the cardiac intervention in Washington & across the USA succeeds, but the harsh, essential cancer treatment overseas is ignored, the mercy mission will founder.
In which case, prepare for August 1914. On steroids. /24. End
In which case, prepare for August 1914. On steroids. /24. End