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Here's a thread on disagreement and debunking from chapter 5 of Nathan Ballantyne's "Knowing Our Limits."
tl;dr Attributing bias is a weak strategy; it simply requires knowledge we cannot reliably or reasonably ascertain.
tl;dr Attributing bias is a weak strategy; it simply requires knowledge we cannot reliably or reasonably ascertain.
1/ Let's start with a definition of what "debunking reasoning" is.
Debunking Reasoning:: attributing biases to others and thus preventing their dissent from lowering our confidence in our views.
Debunking Reasoning:: attributing biases to others and thus preventing their dissent from lowering our confidence in our views.
2/ Although debunking reasoning promises to preserve reasonable belief in the face of disagreement, we'll soon see that debunking often won't be reasonable for us once we realize what it demands and once we know how people tend to make judgements about biases.
3/ So, how does debunking reasoning work? There are two parts:
- Bias Premise:: some thinker is biased regarding proposition P.
- Debunking Claim:: we have reason to reduce confidence in that thinker's report about P.
- Bias Premise:: some thinker is biased regarding proposition P.
- Debunking Claim:: we have reason to reduce confidence in that thinker's report about P.
4/ So let's talk about some common "debunking" strategies that I'm sure we've all seen.
There are [[Four Types of Debunking Strategies]]:
There are [[Four Types of Debunking Strategies]]:
5/ Dogmatic Dismissal Strategy:: this strategy fails because it licenses an extremely dogmatic response to any and all opponents: whenever others disagree with us, this strategy lets us infer that they are mistaken by appealing to our reasons for thinking we are correct.
6/ Unresponsive-to-Compelling-Evidence:: this strategy moves our disputants aside by the sheer force of our evidence. This approach is not always very useful for controversial beliefs where the evidence itself, or its interpretation, is in disputation.
7/ Biasing-Factor-Attribution Strategy:: here we find an inference that's a kind of statistical syllogism, where we argue inductively from a mostly-true generalization to a specific case.
8/ Self-Exculpating Strategy:: we accept we are not biased and are confident that other side has no other reason than bias to disagree.
9/ Now that we've set up our debunking strategies, let's take a look at three cognitive mechanisms that have been found to generate a bias blind spot.
10/ The first bias blind spot arises from an important evidential asymmetry between judgements of self and others.
- When we make judgements about bias within ourselves, we rely on introspective evidence.
- When we judge bias in others we rely on behavioral evidence.
- When we make judgements about bias within ourselves, we rely on introspective evidence.
- When we judge bias in others we rely on behavioral evidence.
11/ Most biases are not reliably detected by introspection. "Human judgements - even very bad ones - do not smell."
The ~feeling~ that we've done our level best to be unbiased will encourage us to think we are unbiased, but that feeling **should not be trusted**.
The ~feeling~ that we've done our level best to be unbiased will encourage us to think we are unbiased, but that feeling **should not be trusted**.
12/ Even when subjects recognize bias in their judgmental strategies, they fail to recognize a closely related potential for bias in judgements based on those strategies.
13/ The second bias blind spot arises from naĂŻve realism.
When we find that people disagree with us, we treat this as prima facie evidence against our views. Then we resolve the dissonance in favor of our views, often by way of attributing bias to our interlocuter.
When we find that people disagree with us, we treat this as prima facie evidence against our views. Then we resolve the dissonance in favor of our views, often by way of attributing bias to our interlocuter.
14/ The third bias blind spot is found in the motive of self-enhancement, which is the motivation to increase the positivity of one's self-views. The self-enhancement motive may influence a wide variety of social, affective, and cognitive functions.
15/ These three psychological mechanisms lead to the conviction that our judgements are less susceptible to bias than the judgements of others.
16/ This leads us to a question: How often do we have good reasons to debunk testimony from those who disagree with us?
The process of **debiasing** is problematic, if not impossible for four psychological reasons:
The process of **debiasing** is problematic, if not impossible for four psychological reasons:
17/
1 The thinker's lack of awareness of his or her mental processes
2 His or her lack of control over mental processes
3 Inaccurate theories about biasing influences on judgement
4 Inadequate motivation to correct for bias
1 The thinker's lack of awareness of his or her mental processes
2 His or her lack of control over mental processes
3 Inaccurate theories about biasing influences on judgement
4 Inadequate motivation to correct for bias
18/ All of these will prevent successful debiasing. Debiasing demands knowledge that individuals often lack.
Good reason for regarding ourselves as having debiased for the blind spot is uncommon in the kind of controversial disagreements we care about.
Good reason for regarding ourselves as having debiased for the blind spot is uncommon in the kind of controversial disagreements we care about.
19/ This makes the **Self-Exculpating Strategy** a poor one: you cannot readily or reliably locate bias within yourself, nor can you remove it by those means.
20/ As for the **Bias-Factor-Attribution-Strategy** one precondition for successfully using this strategy is that we LACK a reason to accept that a biasing factor holds for us.
But as we've seen, we have reason to doubt that our perspective on ourselves is objective.
But as we've seen, we have reason to doubt that our perspective on ourselves is objective.
21/ Are our abstract theories of bias correct? We also appeal to behavioral evidence when determining bias in others, but our uptake of that evidence may be influenced by unreliable evidence-gathering methods. How can we know?
22/ This leads, finally, to some important questions we should ask ourselves when we're dealing with others who hold different opinions on controversial topics:
23/
What is our reason to think that our self-judgements about biases are reliably formed?
Why do we think our abstract theories of bias are any good?
What is our reason to think that our self-judgements about biases are reliably formed?
Why do we think our abstract theories of bias are any good?
24/
Why do we think our methods for collecting behavioral evidence about dissenters are reliable?
Why do we think we have adequately searched for factors that may enlighten disagreeing thinkers?
Why do we think our methods for collecting behavioral evidence about dissenters are reliable?
Why do we think we have adequately searched for factors that may enlighten disagreeing thinkers?
25/ The two key lessons to takeaway from this are
Lesson 1: without the safeguard of debunking reasoning, we should change our minds at least to some extent.
- Lesson 2: we need better methods to make judgements about biases.
Lesson 1: without the safeguard of debunking reasoning, we should change our minds at least to some extent.
- Lesson 2: we need better methods to make judgements about biases.
