I've been thinking about this comment from @philosophybites in response to a trans academic (and similar comments he's made elsewhere)

let's set aside the issue of whether Warburton's right in his characterisation of "what philosophy is" - I think it's questionable, and frankly itself somewhat dogmatic, but that's by the by

what he seems to be saying (and I invite @philosophybites to disagree if I'm wrong) is that philosophy as an activity (one which necessarily takes place in the world, I think) is not subject to ethical considerations

it is always legitimate to philosophise about anything at all, regardless of what harms might be done. (I think @philosophybites is making this claim, which seems to go beyond the claim that Stock's philosophy does no harm)

allowing philosophy to be an activity which can be done no matter what the consequences or the harms - then care and love and kindness are infinitely more valuable than philosophy, and where they conflict, philosophy should be rejected, not other values

philosophy has historically been used to shore up misogynistic oppression (Michele Le Doeuff writes well on this) and racist frameworks. that is not valuable merely by being philosophy @philosophybites

there's a quote from Anna Karenina which I drew on in my thesis: "Reason could not discover love for the other, because it's unreasonable."

the use of philosophical reason, unless guided by the unreasonable love for the other, can work to oppress and cause harm

if there is a choice between philosophy and love, I think love is the necessary choice

as it happens, I don't think that choice is necessary! I think philosophy as an activity can be loving. but being loving means knowing that not every question is right to philosophise about at every moment

and being loving certainly doesn't entail responding to a trans academic by telling them that philosophers are in fact entitled to debate their existence

if philosophers are entitled to debate whatever they want at all times, so much the worse for philosophy

(I've tagged @philosophybites in these tweets as it seems to be what he prefers)

I also don't think this is especially relevant to free speech - I'm concerned with the values that philosophers apply to themselves when doing philosophy

it's also a minor point, but I'm struck by @philosophybites' objection to being referred to as "Nigel" by strangers. He says that it's patronising. Rather than engaging with their arguments, he's highlighted how their use of language has a detrimental effect

which is fine: it may well be patronising. but is this not a concession that the ways in which philosophical discourse can be carried out can have negative effects on people? Can be cruel or hurtful? It seems that he'd rather they didn't refer to him as "Nigel"

if that isn't a breach of their free speech (and I don't think it is), why is it a breach of free speech when trans people object to how they're discussed by Stock et al.?