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In light of the news that the US Senate is looking likely to be tied (with the VP vote as tie break), time for a thread on something I’ve been thinking about for a bit: view of the US in current U.K. politics, or a ‘not mentioning the GFA in 2016’-style elephant in the room 1/N
We hear a lot about the likelihood or not of a trade deal with the US being agreed (annoyingly, still with little context of *how* and *why* the US govt would/does agree FTAs; tl:dr version, both houses of Congress have to approve and domestic politics most important factor) 2/N
(Incidentally, given how normal U.K. political commentators seem to think it is for HMG’s stance being (entirely) set by domestic politics RN, rather than international relationships/standing, the fact that US politicians may do the same should not be a conceptual surprise) 3/N
But a rather large issue that I don’t see being raised is that, outside of an FTA or not, the U.K. and HMG seems blissfully unprepared for the reality of the U.K. not having the role it had with the US anymore, on a policy, cooperation, inward investment and political level 4/N
Have always been skeptical about the “special relationship” beloved of ministerial trips to the US (it’s pretty cringey up close), as it seemed like something the U.K. side thought was a thing and the US side not so much, but the latter is full of experienced pols used to... 5/N
Performing “specialness” with multiple countries, in the interests of advancing US soft and hard power; but whilst the U.K. was an English-speaking important member of the EU, this pantomime of mismatched expectations creaked along. Now we’re not. 6/N
Clearly the thought that Trump would lose the presidency was a surprising one to No10 (which... they will have been briefed but 
), hence the new-found interest in COP26 etc to try and find a new way to position the U.K. in a way that could be seen as relevant to DC 7/N
), hence the new-found interest in COP26 etc to try and find a new way to position the U.K. in a way that could be seen as relevant to DC 7/N
But I see no indication that the reality, said publicly by US politicians and diplomats (Chris Coons on this morning after the election was particularly clear), is that the U.K. has forfeited the thing that made it most important to the US 8/N
And imperilled another (NI GFA), more important to a domestic US audience than the U.K. (Irish caucus is very big, very important, and bipartisan/multi-regional). This was, from the US view, deeply stupid, and a signal to the US that the U.K. no longer wants a “special rel” 9/N
The continuation of some kind of performative “special relationship” post-Brexit (though I doubt there would have been anything in substance, no FTA etc) was only going to happen with co-branded Brexit and America First twin domestic politics. What is HMG’s plan now? 10/N
It is easy to cheerfully chant “sovereignty” to a domestic in-group, but the reality is that the U.K. has benefitted from a closer relationship (however one-sided and flawed) with the US (due largely to EU) and we have no plan for being back of the queue with the US 11/N
The FTA (which I think is now and was always largely magical thinking by the U.K., or like most Vote Leave promises, meant more as an aspiration than a commitment) is just one piece of the puzzle; are we in the U.K. prepared for being much less relevant to the US and ex-EU? 12/N
I think it’s more likely that it just hasn’t occurred to No10 that the clear public messages the US are giving are actually true; ideologically, if you do believe the U.K. is uniquely special and eg will prosper through buccaneering (), you also believe in special rel 13/N
), you also believe in special rel 13/N
The imperial British version from pre-1812, where the US is still the up and coming “rebellious child” of the British empire; the U.K. won WWII with the US’s “help” (no Russia) etc alternate history where the special rel is hasn’t the US done well but they owe it all to us 14/N
This doesn’t play well in America (any part). It was cringey when we mattered as an English-speaking entry into the European SM. Now we don’t have that plus we want all kinds of things from the US... 15/N
Eg FTA, in on multilateral negotiations we used to have, a security relationship when we’ve given up our access to EU security databases, and we’re expecting for the US to be interested in our wants and our problems, having gotten rid of our side of the bargain with them 16/N
It will be interesting to see what happens over the coming weeks and months as the reality of this starts to set in. My prediction would be that US is likely to be far less forgiving of the U.K. ignoring its wishes and interests than even the EU of the nastiness re Brexit 17/N
Finally, in the domestic politics of this, usually U.K. and US try to stay out of each other’s campaigning but Trump busted that apart by claiming Brexit as a Trumpian project and first May (awkwardly) and Johnson (enthusiastically) jumped on board. Biden seeing Johnson...18/N
As a “physical and emotional clone” of Trump was less his personal opinion than a reflection of these political choices; that’s now the reality of perception for a lot of US politicos, that Johnson is the British Trump he positioned himself to be. Upshot now is... 19/N
In US domestic politics, it’s not necessarily a bad thing from their perspective for the Dems to have a counter factual “British Trump” if his projects and policies are going quite badly. Realpolitik is against the U.K.’s myriad asks gaining traction for this reason as well 20/N
Don’t see a solution short of a 180 degree shift from HMG to align with newly-energised, diverse Dems; but that would mean giving up stoking culture wars/xenophobia, central to current MO. As most of this seems not to have occurred to No10, interested to see what 2021 brings /Fin
