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(1/7 )Thanks again to @jppjagannath1 @DrGunaRock and @Journal_INDOPAC for the chance to write about Chinese views of the Quad. Below I’ve done up a short thread on some of the more interesting points that came up in the research
(2/7) Quad remains a secondary concern for some Ye Hailin (CASS) for ex. argues that Quad activities to date have been focused within the Indian Ocean, which constitutes China’s “secondary strategic direction” (中国的次要战略方向), and not on par with Tw or Korean Penn
(3/7) Many view Quad as component of US fp designed to reverse its decline in the region This view shows up in PRC statements sometimes as well, such as FM Wang Yi’s complaints at Sept. 2020 ASEAN FM Meeting that US “refuses to embrace the historical trend toward multipolarity”
(4/7) Quad is a tool to undermine China’s regional influence Zhang Li (Sichuan) e.g. argues the Quad targets China’s maritime activities and BRI explicitly. Many also note JPN FM Kōno’s Oct. ‘17 statements about desire to work w/the Quad counteract China’s expansion under BRI
(5/7)Some see Australia and Japan as playing a more dominant role A subset of authors, however, see Quad resurgence as a consequence of the US retreat from the region which has motivated Australia and Japan to try and keep Washington engaged
(6/7)Use of economic diplomacy to counter the Quad. So how do Chinese authors talk about PRC responses? Many point to economic diplomacy. Zhang Li (CASS) e.g. notes PRC economic pressure in 07 influenced AUS decision to focus on economic and trade with China at Quad’s expense
(7/7)PRC econ. diplomacy “targets” shift from India to ASEAN.. Writings initially focused on India, though tensions have made it less attractive for econ. outreach. Others contend Quad activities undermine “ASEAN Centrality”–which has been a concern for some ASEAN member states
