I sincerely think that the "mind-body problem" boils down to the distinctness between a representation and the represented. Do you think this is naïve? Let me explain. 1/8

There are three main theses.

Thesis 1: Kantian humility. Representation can never tell what the represented is like in itself. I can never know what the reality outside my consciousness is like, because my knowing happens in my consciousness. 2/

Thesis 2: Concreteness of experience. My own experience is the only process whose in-itself-nature I can know. Such knowledge is not representational. This is captured, e.g., by the notion of non-duality ("One", "Emptiness", "This") in Zen-philosophy. 3/

Thesis 3: The thing-in-itself that underlies a scientific representation of "neural correlates of consciousness" is experience. E.g., the thing-in-itself that produces fMRI images is the experience of the person in the scanner.

These theses have various implications. 4/

First implication: We can model reality non-redundantly, but just model. Eliminativism is right that there are no "phenomenal properties" that lie outside the scope of science. But the thing-in-itself that science models as "neural process" is phenomenal throughout. 5/

Second implication: All things-in-themselves are continuous with human consciousness. On the level of scientific models, neural processes are weakly emergent from subatomic processes. It's all the same "stuff". Our own point of view shows that this stuff is experiental. 6/

Final implication: The hard problem of consciousness cannot be solved. It's the human condition that we are organisms with boundaries. What's outside me (my consciousness) I can merely represent. As represented, everything outside my consciousness appears to be physical. 7/

So, we are doomed to stay in, as it were, Plato's cave, staring at the shadow-play. However, we ourselves are also the light that casts shadows in other people's consciousnesses: We are ourselves things themselves. This can help understand the universe and our place in it. 8/8