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I have a slightly different take on the interplay of the various clauses. @JJSchroden
The two substantial clauses, namely preventing terror groups from planning attacks and intra-Afghan talks were clearly negotiated under the premise of 'ongoing obligations'. https://twitter.com/and_huh_what/status/1345431335129600002
The two substantial clauses, namely preventing terror groups from planning attacks and intra-Afghan talks were clearly negotiated under the premise of 'ongoing obligations'. https://twitter.com/and_huh_what/status/1345431335129600002
Hence they will continue to be operative post any withdrawal.
As for not attacking major cities, it really depends on the context (and the wording and structure of secret annexes will be key here).
As for not attacking major cities, it really depends on the context (and the wording and structure of secret annexes will be key here).
If they were negotiated as part of steps to allow smooth withdrawal, then they could end with full withdrawal & TB is no longer obligated to adhere to this restriction. This interpretation makes sense as TB is not to attack intl forces or take action that interferes with wthdrwal
If they were in context of broader RiV, then they operate for duration of intra-Afghan talks. Clearly there is no obligation or expectation to adhere to this if talks collapse. But, under this interpretation, TB required to take concrete steps to facilitate talks. This being one.
The fact that agreement talks about this being part one of an ongoing process that will lead to a comprehensive ceasefire lends credibility to this. Also, verbal agreements on RiV also strengthen this interpretation.
So leverage is available to US post-withdrawal for enforcing this agreement? Three letters: B. S. A.
One action by US under above agreement to enforce agreement will probably compel the TB to at least pause and consider long-term ramifications of any violations.
One action by US under above agreement to enforce agreement will probably compel the TB to at least pause and consider long-term ramifications of any violations.
Overall, I think the expectation of both US and AFG govt will be that TB will adhere to this particular provision for the duration of talks.
For TB, attacking urban centres in the middle of talks would be risky and most likely will derail entire process.
For TB, attacking urban centres in the middle of talks would be risky and most likely will derail entire process.
On the other hand, if talks collapse, no one will/should have expectation that TB will adhere to this clause. This was either: 1) to facilitate withdrawal or 2) facilitate talks. Since it will not longer be doing either, TB can be expected to push for military advantage in cities
The difficult part is: will TB push the envelope a little if talks are stalled. The actions of TB in Lashkargah show the group willing to test limits of agreement even when withdrawal is not complete.
They will most likely push that limit if withdrawal happens & talks r stalled
They will most likely push that limit if withdrawal happens & talks r stalled
So the best way to prevent this would be to ensure progress on all major sticking points before withdrawal or ensure there is some form of quick resolution process when impasses are reached.
Alternative or additional step would be to have a permanent RiV for duration of talks.
Alternative or additional step would be to have a permanent RiV for duration of talks.
This would be one way to ensure parties don't resort to the 'violence as leverage' tactic.
In the up side, there seems to be a realisation across board that even if US delayed withdrawal for a short period, it will not be for a long period.
Thus urgency of talks is setting in
In the up side, there seems to be a realisation across board that even if US delayed withdrawal for a short period, it will not be for a long period.
Thus urgency of talks is setting in
