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A few thoughts ahead of the first anniversary of the US drone killing of Soleimani and Mohandis:
1. The preoccupation with a sizeable commemorative/revenge attack on the exact date is likely more an American than an Iranian phenomenon.
1. The preoccupation with a sizeable commemorative/revenge attack on the exact date is likely more an American than an Iranian phenomenon.
1.1. Hostages to fortune etc but I’m seeing a lot of QS being folded into a more durable self-justifying mythology of resistance and loss. It’s a powerful thing, but winnows if you act on it.
1.2. US’s problem is it only gets to kill QS once. Iran only really gets to avenge him once. Why now? Bc of a date? There’s expectations to manage but it doesn’t make sense, given everything else in play.
2. There is a paucity of official US targets in Iraq and these will have substantial protections. Others attacks in the region also possible but less likely (I don’t treat these here).
3. Any attack will be more likely to be one commissioned within Iraq, not Iran. Whatever the progenitor relationships and shared ideology, I think resistance splinter groups both most likely instigators and, as wind-up-and-let-go groups, have autonomy from PMUs and IRGC/Tehran.
3.1. This autonomy was a big asset since in March, but right now is a major liability for the established fasail and their reports. Nobody fully controls anyone else: we’re waiting on the most motivated, least-risk averse actor. Not much strategy at that level.
4. RSGs have despite IRGC restraint messaging resumed frequent IED attacks on US contracted supply convoys and their last IZ rocket attack demonstrates limits to the US IZ C-RAM system - not far-fetched to see that as a probing attack.
4. In all, the most likely threats are freelanced RSG attacks on major sites in Baghdad, inc embassy and DSC at BIAP. IRGC etc threats boilerplate.
4.1. Prob doesn’t help much re escalation given a publicised US position to hold Iran responsible despite strong threat of freelancing, and bc US will likely strike up the food chain if it strikes.
5. There is a secondary threat that rallies commemorating QS and AMaM turn into a rush on the IZ. But IZ security is much improved and there’s been an emerging back channel between the naughty PMUs and the PM/ISF. Perhaps just enough steel there to face them down.
6. Obviously the threats are elevated and the escalation dynamics are extremely concerning, not least in DC. It’s a threatening time. But worth keeping threats in perspective. Iran capable of surprise, but this is doesn’t get of hand unless at some level Trump admin wants it to.
7. Still, any kind of spectacle will itself be yet another signal failure of Iraq’s conventional security state and beleaguered PM here, and a marker for the new US administration for whether Iraq is worth more equity, regardless of how much it may need it.
And with that I’ve become everything I’ve professed to hate. A Numbered Tweets Guy 
