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Not entirely correct. Britain’s place in the world is psychological more than material. The U.K. tends to define itself by relation to others. Hence the ‘three circles’, for example.
By the early 1960s. British policy circles and strategic planning foresaw a multipolar world. 1/ https://twitter.com/julianhjessop/status/1345344086065221635
By the early 1960s. British policy circles and strategic planning foresaw a multipolar world. 1/ https://twitter.com/julianhjessop/status/1345344086065221635
A world where ‘medium powers’ lost capacity to reasonably influence events. Since the UK’s primary aim was to continue to be a nation of import, the ability to influence considerably was seen as vital. 2/
What was assessed as “…there is a tendency towards largescale multilateral diplomacy in which medium powers can be effective only if they concert
their efforts.” in FCO 49/432 (1973) In essence: 3/
their efforts.” in FCO 49/432 (1973) In essence: 3/
As a result “There [was] room for doubt whether any middle sized power will be able to operate on a global scale in all these areas in the late 1970s.” (FCO 49/432 4/
Influence was still seen through the prism of influencing the superpowers. For Britain, this meant America. Norman Brooks, the Cabinet Secretary, had already identified Europe as a vital factor for influencing the Americans in 1958: 5/
we can still hope to exercise substancial influence in world affairs in conjunction with the power of the United States, partly in our own right, partly as the leader of the independent Commonwealth, and
partly in virtue of the special position we occupy in Europe.” 6/
partly in virtue of the special position we occupy in Europe.” 6/
(PREM 11/2321)
Of course, by the mid-1960s, the Commonwealth was viewed as defunct, and the other plan to withdrawal East of Suez was fretted over as a diminution of British material power to an extent that would irrevocably damage its influence of the US. 7/
Of course, by the mid-1960s, the Commonwealth was viewed as defunct, and the other plan to withdrawal East of Suez was fretted over as a diminution of British material power to an extent that would irrevocably damage its influence of the US. 7/
Thus, by 1971, it was viewed by Whitehall that - “…there is no good alternative policy to membership of the Community. Failure of the negotiations would be a severe blow to our international standing and prospects.” - PREM 15/369 (1971) 8/
Now this can be debated, but this *was* the general view of Whitehall for the 60s-70s. Since Britain’s ‘place in the world’ was so dependent on self perception. It’s wrong to dismiss the importance of the EEC/EU in British grand strategic thinking End/
