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Recently, I have been researching late war US infantry divisions deployed to the ETO in autumn/winter 1944. It may interest some to learn that some divisions did not arrive in theater whole; priority was placed on a div’s three organic infantry regiments...
...with support elements to follow on at a later date. These infantry regiments were grouped as “task forces” for training and administrative purposes, but were wholly dependent on whatever corps or division to which they were assigned for all support services.
The US 63rd Infantry Division was one such unit. Like all divisions working up to deployment in 1943, 63 ID lost much of its trained infantry strength to replacement drafts in mid-year. These losses were made good by the reassignment of men from other branches.
When the division received its movement orders for overseas service in Nov. 1944, the orders specified that only the division’s three infantry regiments were to be alerted for immediate shipment overseas.
In addition,a small HQ detachment headed by the assistant div cmdr would accompany the three regts. All supporting elements—arty, engineers, comms, etc.—were left in CONUS. As the div had worked hard to rebuild its cohesion and esprit d’corps during AGF tests, this came as a blow
The loss of support elements—especially quartermaster units—organic to the div placed the three deploying regts at the mercy of base personnel at points of embarkation and debarkation. Needless to say, 63 ID’s arrival at Marseilles was a fraught one.
As the shortage of trained inf replacements became acute in the autumn of 1944, US 6 AG planned to integrate 63 ID’s inf regts into quiet sections of the line in between training periods as it awaited the arrival of the rest of the div. The Ardennes Offensive changed all that.
Christened Task Force Harris, the three inf regts and HQ detachment continued with training until 24 Dec. 1944, when 6 AG alerted US Seventh Army to an enemy buildup in the Black Forest. TF Harris was bulked up with signals, arty, and AT units, just short of division strength.
Lacking crucial components—quartermaster, medical det., MP det., and ordnance were missing—the abbreviated division also saw its HQ element shaken up as officers were moved to take commands throughout the composite unit. No training with add-on units was conducted before combat.
TF Harris’s 254th Inf. Regt. was detached and given to 3 ID at Colmar, leaving the unit short of vital infantry strength. Thereafter, the 255th Inf. Regt. was detached to 100 ID, and the 253rd Inf. and the HQ detachment joined 44 ID for the battle to come.
All three regiments performed well according to Seventh Army reports. The 254th Inf. received the Presidential Unit Citation for its role in 3 ID’s operations. In each case, the roles assigned TF Harris’s units were of a limited category, yet all fought well.
By 1 Feb. 1945, 63 ID was finally reunited and performed well for the duration of the war. Both 42 and 70 IDs were introduced to combat under the same conditions but with slightly different results.
The US VI Corps, to which the task forces built from the infantry strength of 42 and 70 ID, were assigned, carried only two infantry divisions, and the attachment of six additional infantry units was an overburden that complicated combat effectiveness.
TF Harris’s success was owed to the larger size of XV Corps, which was able to accommodate—even welcomed—the additional infantry strength as it blunted the blows of Operation Nordwind. The nature of this fighting was mostly defensive, lessening the burden on transport.
