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The year 2020 was all about #COVID19 in 
Hungarian politics as well. A few thoughts in this thread about how this year has played out for the Orbán government. 1/22
Hungarian politics as well. A few thoughts in this thread about how this year has played out for the Orbán government. 1/22
The Orbán government, which is in charge of a small, highly centralised country and is equipped with a 2/3 supermajority in parliament & extreme emergency powers, was in theory one of the best situated in international comparison to respond forcefully to a pandemic. 2/22
Its failure to do so in the 2nd wave of the #COVID19 crisis is not merely a public policy disaster. It is a premeditated decision to prioritise the economy over the goal of mitigating the impact of the coronavirus. 3/22
Although in a more sophisticated manner than Trump or Bolsonaro, Orbán has essentially embraced the “economy first” mantra, and by December 2020 the statistics reflected this, as Hungary ranked among the countries with the highest #COVID19 fatality rate. 4/22
Fidesz is mainly interested in making its narrative the hegemonic one in public discourse. According to this narrative, the government is manning the barricades and whatever happens despite its earnest efforts has been preordained by fate. 5/22
At the same time, Fidesz aims to divert the attention from the real problems (the health, economic and social aspects of the crisis) and put identity politics to the top of the political agenda. 6/22
Since the migration scaremongering appears to have worn thin, the Hungarian government uses Hungary’s LGBT community as the next scapegoat. https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/pandemic-rages-hungary-ramps-anti-lgbtq-legislation-n1248659 7/22
It has also become a commonplace in the last few years that the Orbán government never misses an opportunity to change the political playing field in its own favour. 8/22
The developments of 2020 have proved that Orbán is using the virus as a cover to pass measures to cement his power, institutionalize the funneling of public funds to allies and limit the chances of the opposition in the next election. 9/22
A prime example is the attack on opposition-run municipalities, which includes cutting back the tax income of local governments and a ban on any local tax raises in 2021, among many others. https://www.reuters.com/article/hungary-economy-orban/update-2-hungarian-pm-cuts-local-business-tax-budapests-opposition-mayor-cries-foul-idINL5N271321
The lawmakers of Fidesz also included a new definition of public funds into the Constitution, which reduces transparency and ensures that Fidesz would remain in control of certain institutions and state resources even if it lost the next elections. 11/22
These examples show that Fidesz spends a significant amount of its energy to make sure that the opposition will be in an even more difficult position to compete in 2022 & even if Fidesz loses, it can keep control of key institutions and resources after the next elections. 12/22
Governance is always a predominantly party political issue under Fidesz, but classic policy decision-making will take even more of a backseat in 2021. 13/22
With the 2022 campaign looming large, the Orbán government will devote all its attention to safeguarding its power and subordinate policy decisions even more than usual to boosting its position in that campaign. 14/22
To a significant extent, Fidesz’s strategy and actions in 2021 will be shaped by the moves of the united opposition. Regardless of their individual party preferences, a vast majority of opposition voters agree with the strategy of their parties. 15/22
The minority who would harbour reservations about a joint list featuring many political figures that they view as unpalatable will be the most crucial bloc of swing voters, and thus the main targets of the Fidesz campaign. 16/22
It seems highly likely that Fidesz’s campaign will focus intensely on persuading these voters that they cannot in good conscience vote for former PM Gyurcsány if they are conservative, for example, or, for Jobbik if they are liberal and anti–racist. 17/22
This is a politically highly volatile time and the long-term impact of the Covid pandemic is still far from clear. Although Fidesz remains the largest party by far, recent polls suggest that the overall opposition is at the end of 2020 is slightly ahead in the polls. 18/22
If this trend persists, then early 2021 may mark the first time since Spring 2015 that the Hungarian opposition would be able to win a majority if the election were held at the time. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-politics-polls-idUSKBN28X11Q 19/22
However, this statement is only true if the rules of the game were not changed until 2022. During the last decade, Fidesz has proved its willingness to use its parliamentary supermajority to tilt any playing field to its advantage, once it appears necessary. 20/22
By now, it is clear that the protracted crisis as a consequence of the 2nd wave of the pandemic is the real test of Fidesz’s economic and social crisis management. https://twitter.com/BiroNagyAndras/status/1330565089729122308 21/22
From the perspective of the 2022 elections, the crucial issue is whether the Fidesz government can maintain the belief that it can manage the economy even in persistently difficult economic circumstances. 22/22
