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A thread outlining my thoughts on Second World War tactics.
For me tactics only makes sense when looked at as a socio-technical system. This thread reflects that way of thinking.
Again I'll be using British examples but there are some US crossovers later on.
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For me tactics only makes sense when looked at as a socio-technical system. This thread reflects that way of thinking.
Again I'll be using British examples but there are some US crossovers later on.
1/
My starting place is Lionel Wigram and the Battle School Movement.
The principle objectives were concerned with training a mass of newly conscripted infantry in how to fight. There were precedents from the FWW. This movement though was set up by a Territorial Army officer.
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The principle objectives were concerned with training a mass of newly conscripted infantry in how to fight. There were precedents from the FWW. This movement though was set up by a Territorial Army officer.
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I referenced Tim Harrison-Place's excellent book in an earlier thread on SWW small arms.
There's also this excellent article on Wigram and the Infantry Schools.
3/ https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096834450000700403
There's also this excellent article on Wigram and the Infantry Schools.
3/ https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096834450000700403
Wigram sought to inoculate new soldiers from the chaos of battle while training them in the basics of what might simplistically be called fire and movement.
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As I said in this earlier thread, there was a tension within the Army between those were part of the institution's professional ethos and the new conscripts that made up the mass of the infantry.
5/ https://twitter.com/warmatters/status/1341877326808793089?s=20
5/ https://twitter.com/warmatters/status/1341877326808793089?s=20
This tension could be seen in surveys conducted by Ministry of Supply Weapon's Technical Staff who in 1942 noted that:
6a/
6a/
"It will be seen from the detailed answers… that opinions on quite elementary points are frequently conflicting, if not directly contradictory, as between different units and formations"
6b/
6b/
And...
"It will be seen from the detailed answers… that opinions on quite elementary points are frequently conflicting, if not directly contradictory, as between different units and formations"
6c/
"It will be seen from the detailed answers… that opinions on quite elementary points are frequently conflicting, if not directly contradictory, as between different units and formations"
6c/
At the same time, in Italy in 1943, Wigram noted that on average a British Army platoon would almost invariably be 25% "gutful," men who would go anywhere and do anything...
7a/
7a/
[cont.]
...50% "sheep," men who would follow closely behind if well led, and about 25% "cowards," who quickly ran or became ineffectual once the fighting started.
7b/
...50% "sheep," men who would follow closely behind if well led, and about 25% "cowards," who quickly ran or became ineffectual once the fighting started.
7b/
The problem was that the technology being used by the Infantry reinforced the problems that Wigram had identified.
A 9lb rifle & a 22lb LMG plus SAA & all the other accoutrements undermined movement.
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A 9lb rifle & a 22lb LMG plus SAA & all the other accoutrements undermined movement.
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This had been noted by the Armament Design Establishment who had been working on weapons that would offer weight savings and help to generate firepower.
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But it had also been noted by Major-General T.N.F Wilson who was the first to be appointed to the new position of Director of Infantry.
Previously this position did not exist.
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Previously this position did not exist.
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With the Ministry of Supply & reps from commands Wilson set up the Standing Committee on Infantry Weapon Development.
The committee's terms of reference were to ensure that...
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The committee's terms of reference were to ensure that...
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The goal to restore confidence in the equipment and weapons being used by the infantry AND to try and address the fact that the infantry and their battalion commanders didn't always know how to make best use of their weapons.
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In movement was going to be restored to the infantry platoon then soldiers would need technology that encouraged them to actually move.
That meant bringing "all available infantry weapons to bear upon the enemy... [cont.]
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That meant bringing "all available infantry weapons to bear upon the enemy... [cont.]
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[cont.] Not only in the initial stage of the advance but also up to the last possible moment so that the infantry can literally be shot into close quarters"
Wilson discussed this in the RUSI journal in Feb 1944.
14/ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071844409419536
Wilson discussed this in the RUSI journal in Feb 1944.
14/ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071844409419536
Wilson and the various technical branches on the SCIWD understood the tactical problem to be a socio-technical one.
Wilson wrote the infantry, “...must at all times be able to fight their way forward and to close with the enemy with the support of their own weapons [cont.]
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Wilson wrote the infantry, “...must at all times be able to fight their way forward and to close with the enemy with the support of their own weapons [cont.]
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[cont.] It is to this end that the modern organisation and fire power of the infantry is designed. In this organization the balance must be held between fire power, assault power and manoeuvrability"
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As I said before though, the commands themselves were unwilling to mess about with infantry weapons.
Why? Monty understood that the battle was not won by the infantry but through a combination of arms that did the heavy lifting for the infantry.
17/ https://twitter.com/warmatters/status/1341710092471853056?s=20
Why? Monty understood that the battle was not won by the infantry but through a combination of arms that did the heavy lifting for the infantry.
17/ https://twitter.com/warmatters/status/1341710092471853056?s=20
If you want to read more about this and also the story of the EM-2 then check out my article on it here.
There's more to the EM-2 story though - some of it quite convoluted which I can talk through at some point over the next few days/weeks.
18/ https://www.academia.edu/43367431/Operational_Research_Military_Judgement_and_the_Politics_of_Technical_Change_in_the_British_Infantry_1943_1953
There's more to the EM-2 story though - some of it quite convoluted which I can talk through at some point over the next few days/weeks.
18/ https://www.academia.edu/43367431/Operational_Research_Military_Judgement_and_the_Politics_of_Technical_Change_in_the_British_Infantry_1943_1953
Addendum/
And here's the US cross over reference I alluded to at the head of this thread. https://twitter.com/warmatters/status/1343957815015170048?s=20
And here's the US cross over reference I alluded to at the head of this thread. https://twitter.com/warmatters/status/1343957815015170048?s=20
Quote from 6c/ should be:
"… it would appear that many Battalion Commanders are not really qualified to comment usefully on their weapons."
I'll make more of this at a later point.
"… it would appear that many Battalion Commanders are not really qualified to comment usefully on their weapons."
I'll make more of this at a later point.
