The recent days quarrel between the #Iraqi gov. and resistance groups reflects an internal Iraqi power struggle more than a US-Iran showdown. With the upcoming anniversary of the killings of Muhandis and Soleimani, the fasa’il may be more anxious to take revenge than Iran is.

On 22 December, a barrage of rockets damaged parts of the US Embassy in the GZ. The @WSJ called it the largest attack on the embassy in a decade. Previous threats by the USG to close the Embassy ahead of an expected US military response still stand.

In the days following the rocket attacks, sec. forces detained members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). On 25 Dec. footage was released of one of the detainees, Husam al-Zerjawi. AAH denied any accusations against him compromising national security and called for his immediate release.

Video footage of unknown resistance groups pledging allegiance to AAH leader Qais al-Khazali circulated on resistance-affiliated platforms threatening to attack the government.

PM Kadhimi ordered the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) into Baghdad streets to avoid a potential repeat of the Dora raid scenario against Kataib Hezbollah (KH) in June, when an armed convoy of the fasa’il threatened the government inside the GZ.

National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji was sent to mediate with AAH. In a tweet on 26 Dec. Khazali claimed that the situation had been resolved, with reason prevailing. The Interior Ministry denied reports that it had transferred custody of the detainee to the Hashd al-Shaabi.

The same day, Abu Ali al-Askeri, KH’s security spokesperson, tweeted that the rocket attacks only play into the enemy’s hands and should stop, but reasserted that the resistance factions will defend each other, as threats against one impacts all of them.

He urged PM Kadhimi not to test the patience of the resistance (Iraqi and foreign), which is ready to confront him, and that intelligence services of neither the US nor Iran can protect him.

This is indicative of two things: On the one hand the fasa’il are emphasizing the national faultline - the resistance against the ‘treacherous’ government - and on the other they distinguish their affiliation with the IRGC/Quds force from the MOIS of Iran.

Simultaneously, another prominent player, Muqtada al-Sadr, seeks to ride the wave of the latest quarrel, presenting himself as a level-headed politician. On 25 Dec. he cautioned against US-Iran tensions playing out in Iraq, and later stated that a US exit should be negotiated.

Whatever happens on the 3 January anniversary, the internal power struggles between the Iran-affiliated resistance groups and the government, Sadr and other more nationalist Shia parties will remain tense in the run-up to the planned June parliamentary elections.

The best scenario for 3 January is one in which continued rocket attacks will cause no casualties nor spark fierce demonstrations by the resistance groups in front of the US Embassy, thus preventing further escalation before Biden takes office on 20 January.

For more more details pertaining to the larger picture of US-Iran tensions, see our @crisisgroup trigger list. https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-us-trigger-list