First thing to note is that the thing should not have been leaked the way it did. I suspect in due course we might find the EU version leaked first (multiple copies floating around and a big Brussels lobby chasing it) but still no excuse if HMG showed the Beeb before MPs.
THE PREAMBLE. We shouldn't dismiss the recitals. Though they are airily aspirational and contextual they do get referenced as legal justification, esp on the EU side (as per the 'ever-closer union' ambition) and so can cause problems
Putting references to human rights and climate change in the opening paragraph as "essential elements" is therefore a bad omen. But may be circumscribed in the main text.
Transparency in investment: may be an opening for Commission engagement on UK OCT banking, though operating to the benefit of all stakeholders does set a limit
I note the 'public morals' interest, which is not unusual but can be elastic. Cultural diversity basically refers to Paris throwing money and quotas at audiovisual to fight English.

Onto the main text.
The article numbering and headings btw while in order are numerically jumbled up and provisionally named so they sound like KGB plans. It implies the document was released pre-polishing, so there is that going for the team in terms of transparency.
COMPROV 1 (p9) surely intentionally echoes the Good Neighbour Clause (Art 8 TEU). It's first outing and the obvious existing legal basis and direction for future relations. A very important road sign for future years.
COMPROV2: The default for future bilaterals will be to add them to this as a single deal. Thus no Swiss-style arrangement unless agreed to. As the Swiss have found, bundling them together is risky. Future UK default must be to always seek to separate them out.
The more unified the deals, the greater the temptation for a future Commission to demand the UK concede a change on pain of unravelling the whole treaty otherwise. Hopefully this won't already be an issue when we come to review the fisheries section.
COMPROV 3: Good Faith Clause. You may recall this was an issue a few weeks back over introducing a notwithstanding clause to the NI protocol... The problem is if the Commission side breach it and UK courts review HMG's options. One to tease a ministerial statement on before then.
COMPROV13 is a statement of safeguard, so there is clarity about the limits of what is quite obviously the UK having to pursue EU law by default. A useful statement adding a reference point of a firewall.
COMPROV16 looks like a Jolyon Clause. Designed to stop third party challenges under the treaty. Not unusual in EU treaties but will help kill the fox of what some might see as Remain-inspired challenges by the vexatious. (No longer in EU's interests either)
Functionally, it looks like an intergovernmental bilateral operating not dissimilarly from how EU-RoK functions: diarised senior meetings to oil the FTA. The big question is how many lower cttees will be set up; meeting how often; under which ministers; with what oversight by MPs
INST2 reveals the answer is 19 (plus 4 working groups), meaning that there will be a lot of backroom activity going on in Brussels. Not surprising: that's why EFTA has an office there. There will need to be a mechanism to keep an eye on and feed into/pull out of EU comitology.
MPs will need to grip this flow diagram and ensure they have clear oversight. Plenty of risks if they don't; considerable opportunities if they do. It's critical to tackle this now at the outset. Here's some groundwork:
As INST4 (p15) states, decisions made in these committees, although by joint unanimity, are binding. Parliament needs to grip this, and also ensure far greater transparency so business groups can get sight. That may mean a Parliamentary Reserve through the Recommendations system.
INST5 formalises a Partnership Assembly for MPs and MEPs. This is not a practical substitute for the above. A minority of Rejoiners could pack it and provide false impressions on the EU side, harming functional relations; it needs to be representative.
The format needs to be far nearer to how things work for recruiting to @PACE_News - an issue for the whips and the Speaker to resolve. In tandem with direct cttee oversight.
INST 6-8 look problematic. The EU loves 'civil society'. But its version is the self-licking lollipop. During the Convention, DHA called it "Brussels talking to Brussels". Simple process: CS - 'Our lobby demands you to do this'; Commission - 'CS wants us to have more powers'
Institutionally this was incorporated in the Great Wastes of Space that are the @EU_CoR and @EU_EESC. Cost: couple of hundred million a year. Value: nil. This looks like they may be getting post-Brexit mini-me's and buy ins.
MPs should demand the UK side's format is informal and not institutionalised, and is focused on sharing info rather than becoming a clearing house for extreme lobbies to add red tape. The Forum in particular risks becoming an expensive and polarising talking shop. Keep it small.
GOODS7.2(d) (p20): Normal customs fees are waived except for exceptional control measures, including higher risk. It may be worth MPs locking down the definition of this threshold in the context of the EU's Precautionary Principle.
GOODS11: on the import/export monopoly, perhaps worth verifying that items with security or defence implications are exempted (sole trusted suppliers for example if a subsidiary is involved). [Anticipating here a specific exemption later in text but PESCO might cause problems]
Similarly, perhaps worth checking that such an exemption exists for material not locally resourced within the Cyprus SBAs.
GOODS17 on trade sanctions (dumping) operates at a lower pace than the Commission seemed to be pressing for. It also follows the WTO principle of a penalty set at equivalent value, and a sort of ne bis in idem. There's also a public interest check first. Plain positives.
GOODS18 refers to two classified documents (ie commercially/trade sensitive) so it'll be up to an MP in the right committee to reflect on them
GOODS19: disputes over customs enforcement are finite (6 months max) and limited to the product area. Deters escalation.

These elements seem to set out good WTO practice.
Here's a sticky one, GOODS.21. You may remember that the Italians and Greeks tried to push a clause on the Elgin Marbles. Not sure what the Italians were after but I suspect it was stolen artefacts (<tombaroli). Unnecessary as HMG has been pushing this policy area in recent years
The Elgin Marbles are excluded from this text as the cut off is 1993, however the Ottoman firman is interpreted. I expect some issues will (continue to) arise in relation to property from North Cyprus down the line.
ORIG5.2 is important. This is wedged into a slightly unexpected spot under ROO. The economic link test for a fishing vessel to qualify as UK is 50% UK national owned; OR with a head office/workplace here and 50% UK owned by a UK company. [To be revisited with the fish section.]
ORIG23 seems to be Amazon and postal gift friendly. That still leaves the 'William Shatner VAT issue' for HMRC to revisit. I suspect the end result though will be a UK store buying stock and becoming a de facto distributor.
ORIG31 Note that this whole Chapter and its annexes can be subsequently changed by the committees. Any issues that MPs pick up now are open to be corrected - or aggravated if done badly.
SPS3.4 Good start: WTO terms expressly take precedence over any definitions a treaty committee may come up with over phytosanitary
SPS5 A stated commitment not to hide behind SPS rules to obstruct trade (another basic principle, but it is being spelled out within the text). A lot of the text seems to be aimed at pre-empting the dirty tricks departments of some member states.
SPS6+. Certification (inc electronic) - if pet passports aren't covered later in the text, there is precedent here to generate a subsequent bolt-on agreement covering it.
SPS8 - generates what amounts to a trusted supplier scheme where there is otherwise a food health scare going on. Conversely this also sets a future precedent for running varied (ie lower) border inspection rates. Tangentially in SPS9 with zones (most famously NI cattle/BSE)
SPS11 Officials can conduct spot checks on the other. Unclear whether this might lead to brave EU officials turning up on a farm or trawler rather than just checking computers at DEFRA.
SPS16 Animal welfare; an area listed for cooperation. Unclear whether the UK could apply tariffs based on conditions, esp if the UK diverges to higher standards and higher costs. Or whether it might be able to generate a new 'UK compassionate farming' label.
SPS17 - co-operation on antimicrobial resistance. Critical but this was being pushed by Sir Richard Body in the mid 1990s! The UK is perhaps more likely to unilaterally act and then face an EU trade backlash, eg over antibiotics for poultry.
TBT section. Well, the WTO's list of TBTs/NTBs runs to around 40 pages long so let's just pick out a few salient points here.
TBT4 requires regulators to carry out impact assessments. The red tape box for many years has been a Commission box ticking exercise. Interesting here that a direct comparison now has to be made with the effect from international standards.
I wonder if this might not be grabbed by less regulation-embracing Member States and Commissioners. There might be a second order effect that emerges from this internally. Esp as para 6 demands a case be made for heavier rules. New anti-red tape faction in Berlaymont?
TBT5 appears to be an attempt to push Commission officials and quangonauts into the international regulatory system, eg UNECE far more.

There will be kick back but this may prove to be the UK's parting gift to the EU. Better lawmaking, less red tape, less protectionism.

Similarly TBT6. There is a push here for letting trade association accreditors play a greater role. [Exactly what this means in practice with the UKTA and conformity testing as of Jan requires separate analysis]
TBT8 Doesn't address the NI labelling issue (for goods arriving from GB to be legal in the EU market), though it does allow for ad hoc relabelling in approved places in NI once goods arrive.
CUSTMS7. Risk management operates along the EU-Singapore principle of checks happening according to the level of perceived risk.
Services seems like an average FTA, enabling activity up to a point. Worth remembering that of the so-called 'Four Freedoms', it's the area that was least pursued by the EU (the UK wanted it; the Germans and French wanted focus on Goods)
I expect this whole area will get a lot of focus. I'll flag up though SERVIN 5.13, which sets the groundwork for future mutual recognition of qualifications - basically a low hurdle unless anyone is protectionist in a given profession.
SERVIN5.23.5 seems to imply a 'reasonable cost' cap on roaming charges (if so, footnote 26 seems to imply they would be factored into the basic contract fee - so, as per today). But SERVIN.5.36 more explicitly pushes transparency and says no fixed rates. Possible conflict?
SERVIN5.33 allows the EU to pursue it's internet restrictions (eg droit de l'oubli, obligations on social media providers) but does not require the UK to.
IP.12 (p129) Authors' rights run for 70 years after their death. Broadcasts and performers, 50 years after first transmission. That's a minimum: both sides (ie probably the EU) may extend them.
Artists' resale rights is more infamous. IP.13 unfortunately does not revoke this: it becomes "defined as an inalienable right, which cannot be waived, even in advance". UK auction firms will not be happy. BUT from the text the UK could elect to set a token rate in law, say 0.1%.
Public Procurement (pp148+) seems to be focusing on the WTO GPA approach: it doesn't look like the UK will have to tender via EU portals (where it has done so disproportionately more than most other EU countries that played less by the rules).
Defence procurement will need separate consideration later: that's under specific risks from the EU's PESCO so needs distinct checking.
Title VII (p153): The fact that the treaty includes a section on SMEs might be a useful reference tool to challenge red tape during the audit referenced above. A cost-benefit detail largely underused has been the red tape burden on SMEs that do not trade with the EU (or much).
Energy, pp156+. Of course, the lights are not just going to go out with Brexit. They wouldn't have with No Deal. But anyhow...
The clauses seem to be based on ensuring continental companies don't get frozen out of the internal UK distribution sector, while being a bit nervously worded on avoiding any pricing cartels and on renewable subsidies. Both areas to watch the EU over.
As indeed are the full implications of the reserve stated in ENER.10 - who (or which country) precisely do people have in mind when talking about reducing monopoly status for energy distributors?
The security of supply sections in ENER17 appear to step back from the Commission's ambitions in direct involvement, with its implications for UK North Sea platforms and EEZ Sovereignty.
There is however to be a Specialised Committee on Energy whose remit (p168) includes areas the Commission might sneak back into these fields; this will be a long term 'one to watch'
The UK reaffirms (p169) its National Energy and Climate Plan green targets, and the Commission its counterpart. Note these are not locked in for either party. UK will likely adhere. EU27 ambitions let alone likely compliance are already known to be, to put it generously, mixed.
(A point to remember down the line when people talk about the UK breaking international rules and the EU sticking to them)
ENER.22 has an interesting insert: support for any green energy must be a verifiable sustainable and quantifiable greenhouse gas win: no green elephants. Opportunities here for rigorous challenges of effects of ecopolicy (eg no sudden swings into subsidising rapeseed).
ENER.23 - new North Seas Energy Forum. Alarm bells flashing here. This should ONLY develop if Norway comes on board, and thus it becomes intergovernmentally tripartite (x4 if Faroes)
ENER.24 covers offshore H+S, the area where the Commission had succeeded in getting onto rigs policy by the back door. That seems now to have been shut down.
NB this whole section only lasts until 2026, but it can be rolled on. So any surprise in it need only be transitional. Reference to it ending separately from the fisheries run down implies it is conceptually part of a wider EEZ reclaim timeframe.
Transparency, p172. An opportunity here to flag up a missed opportunity: fixing the cases of the UK's neglected whistleblowers. And if you don't understand the breaks in the system, you risk reusing the piping. Case studies here;
I urge any MP inclined to debate the transparency clauses (which are a good thing) to first understand exactly how EU laws are made. Before they get to MEPs. Before they get to ministers. This is why this section becomes important.
Article GRP.7: Public consultation should consequently be considered in the framework of a professional Brussels lobby of vast scale, with overseers self-nominated from the Brussels bubble largely via internet pages very few ordinary mortals comb. Bad system.
The extent to which this treaty works will depend considerably on GRP.8: Impact assessment (p177). An early test will be to contrast UK and EU RIAs. These should be published. I'd recommend a running tally on a dedicated  page, with links for submissions
GRP.9: Retrospective evaluation will be the exciting office. Its where the EU failed with its deregulation task force, doing silly things like claiming a win for removing documents still referring to East Germany.
Our big wins from Brexit happen if this team is made up of high fliers, supported by a staff delegated by business groups, combing over all the bad laws they complained about from over the past 30 years but which were "out of scope" through EU membership.
The existence of this clause for the EU MIGHT also be a prompt for bold MEPs to revisit "doing less and doing it better" - what should have happened with the Laeken Mandate and could still happen through imminent Convention II. Probably won't, but the opportunity is there.
Article GRP.12: Regulatory cooperation (p178) might operate as a catch all for UK-EU cooperation wherever needed. Easily terminatable, no obligations or bureaucracy or costs, but a quick fix cover for sorting any admin bumps on areas where there is already cooperation ongoing.
That makes for a very permissive, elastic framework to fill gaps. MEPs might take umbrage if overused but it may well be helpful during the years of change.
Oversight would become harder for MPs, so use would need to be gripped by the minister and not invisibly escalate. Over time they might become new 'rubber articles' generating backdoor integration, so the break aspect is critical and must always be retained.
Bad news: yes, it's there. Recognising the economic, the social, and the environmental, and "preventing distortions of trade or investment" (ie by being competitive by avoiding bad laws). Current levels of standards stay.
BUT "the purpose of this Title is not to harmonise the standards."

So, a circle to be squared.
LPF1.2: member states get to sort out how by themselves. Good news.

Bad news: the Precautionary Principle is endorsed.
Very bad news, looking ahead at the dispute system, it looks like the Commission can trigger it and there's no obvious recourse the UK has.

Possibly find something notionally precautionary to ban back, but then that's in more obvious bad faith because too coincidental.
This is definitely something MPs need to ask about. It may very well be there's a hidden clause somewhere that sets up a distinct arbitration system - but that's not immediately obvious. And the Commission has form in exploiting loopholes (ask John Major).
LPF2.2. Of note it looks like the UK can run a Northern development scheme breaching competition law, so long as it is open about it. Subsidies (3.4, plus WTO constraints) is more limited
This also has positive implications for the UK buying British in Defence procurement. A ministerial statement would reinforce this interpretation if challenged later on.
LPF2.4 (p181) Having become very familiar with the exact distinction the Electoral Commission makes between "cooperation" and "coordination", MPs might usefully determine what is meant by this section using both terms when the former is less dangerous.
LPF3.4.13 allows for the EU to heavily subsidise TENs and emerging IT, where there is "large" cross-border activity. It looks like the UK conceded this subsidy point.
Context: EUR 30.6 billion for transport, EUR 8.7 billion for energy and EUR 3 billion for digital networks for 2021-7. No UK subsidy seems to have been permitted. We might not want to throw state money around but the EU is allowed to do so.
During the € crisis, the EU used these budget lines to redirect billions into hard hit areas not for development but to cushion the economic effects. Again, scope for abuse and one to watch. Especially when it starts throwing big public money to subsidise emerging tech.
LPF3.5 (p187) Keeps the excuse for rolling bail out subsidies for continental state airlines.
LPF3.8 There is a consultation and review process to challenge unfair subsidies. 3.10 seeks to explicitly constrain matters so no consideration is needed by the UK tribunal at all to the CJEU.
Presumably in a UK jurisdiction case, the WA provisions relating to possible initial clarification of EU law by the EU side, undertaken by the CJEU, still apply if the EU side were uncertain before they challenged, but that would be it.
Taxation (LPF5, p199) appears to be set at OECD/global standards rather than locking UK rates into EU ambitions. VAT harmonisation may yet be covered later. But it also seems helpfully to be exempted from dispute resolution: a win - assuming we ever see a Government get to use it
LPF6.2 The UK can basically change its Social Chapter legislation so long as it doesn't in a manner affecting trade or investment. This allows for "reasonable discretion" ... up to a point.
Therein lies the fudge and an uncertain threshold. It allows correcting some of the obvious red tape and even some tweaks to cut costs -until someone on the continent spots an advantage and complains. A very wispy margin of gain, though in any event subject to manifesto pledge.
At this point with a cold office, wailing gusts of wind, and bats shrieking outside (!), I am off home. Tomorrow morning we start again appropriately enough with the environment.
And we're back. Wonder what Santa brings today.
LPF7.2. Environment mirrors the above. Non-regression in principle but some margins of flexibility so long as there is no visible trade/investment diversion. This is clearly the LPF-wide compromise. Ambiguous, requires guts to pursue, but could generate some fair medium term wins
The constraint remains the current carbon targets, though the UK is somewhat ahead of the EU27 in pushing policy (for good and bad). There is an urge in the text but not an obligation to link UK and EU systems in the future. Best avoided.
LPF7.4 sets the Precautionary Principle into environmental policy planning. This includes preventative action. This might open up an option for unchallengeable (see above) Commission protectionism.
It at least merits reflection, for instance over whether subsidy for a factory ostensibly near protected newts might see tariffs mooted by the Commission; or exports whose production might, conceivably, have environmental impact. Thresholds need clarification.
Given the panel system I suspect this should only be a major issue if the Precautionary Principle is called upon.
LPF8.3 raises Labour laws. I have no issues with these so long as they can be set by Parliament to correct costly mistakes. Notably the UK obligation is to the 1961 CoE Social Charter and not the more socially-ambitious 1996 one (which is also more fluid).
This helps summarise the differences:
So a win on this point.
The emphasis is on the UK following common sense standards as expressed in global treaties rather than the EU's uncosted social contract experiments that lose it competitiveness.
I haven't spotted a limit to the UK's options to roll back the SC. I expect the point was made that HMG has politically pledged to retain current standards and the No Deal competitive incentive to do so quickly has gone. So a win over time through debate and reform.
NB a number of elements coming out relate to issues such as "Trade and Forests". These quite happily often stand alone as bilaterals and are not contentious, but have been bundled into the main text. These are what would have made up the dozens of "impossible" mini-deals...!
LPF9 starts to get to the issue of the selection of dispute panellists. The first set of names was already released by HMG, for the Arbitration Panel, around 15 DEC. The risk is that the qualifications set for membership of any such panel bring inbuilt bias towards EU systems.
For an example of what happens if you pick wobbly panellists, see what happened with the resolution of the Oregon Boundary Dispute in 1845.

So selection should not be done casually.
LPF9.4 (p215) is the EU retaliation clause if the UK decides to make a change in the LPF areas that does bring competitive advantage (though proving that will be a dispute in itself: "based on reliable evidence and not merely on conjecture or remote possibility").
The Commission can introduce penalties, though they are "proportionate". It then goes to very speedy arbitration.
I'd rather not have this at all as it limits the appetite of HMG to reform LPF red tape costs above a threshold. But it doesn't prevent them; it limits to a point Commission penalty; and there is a panel (with some small prospect of the UK in turn being able to reciprocate)
Of note, from 2025 onwards there will be scope to review the Trade section of this treaty as well as any other bits anyone wants to revisit. The running of the LPF section will be core. The LPF trigger element gets reviewed anyway on a rolling basis.
Keir Starmer's pledge to revisit the treaty was accidentally then a deliverable pledge. Given the timing it was made (before the text came out) it could only have been a fluke. It still leaves him channelling Harold Wilson as even he doesn't know what he wants to fix.
If the treaty isn't working, then selected sections are renegotiated. If they can't be, any part of the treaty on the agenda can then be repudiated. If Trade drops then Road Transport (ie cabotage) automatically and possibly aviation goes with it.
The temptation may be to limit the scope of talks as a result. But if anyone is unhappy with part or all of the text and does want to completely revisit the last four years, the opportunity is there. Hint: prep in the meantime.
It does though ensure that negotiating the Brexit treaty remains an ongoing issue in the next General Election...
Aviation (p222+) allows for EU<>UK plus third country inwards and onwards, and obviously also transit. This includes air freight. No surprises with that: it was offered unilaterally under No Deal contingencies.
The wording is opaque but there are provisions to allow cross-ticketing with subsidiaries. I'll await expert review on whether a multiple-designated (coded) plane could simply be rebadged on landing for a follow-on internal flight under a different service provider/flight number.
AIRTRN.9 encourages further review of liberalisation so there may be further developments here in any event.
Something of a win on road haulage (p246). Operators of the UK may undertake up to two laden journeys from one Member State to another, before returning to the territory of the United Kingdom. PROVIDING they don't leave the EU - especially that means passing through Switzerland.
OR they can do one follow on delivery within that Member State, within a week. NI hauliers can do two runs within the RoI.
Coaches (Article X+2 - !) can operate internationally but not start and finish in another country. They can pick up or drop off people en route incidentally. (Policing that may generate some issues.)
VSTV.1 (p260) If the UK introduces a visa system for any EU co0untry, it introduces them for all, except IRL (the intent is clearly to trigger reciprocation, and thus seek to deter)
Fish, pp261+. There has been conflicting reports on this. What does it actually say?
FISH.2.3 asserts the Precautionary Principle as part of fisheries policy. Given the truly abysmal EU track record in managing stock, this is possibly the one area where this might on occasion be welcome as a reference point (FISH.3.1b).
FISH.4.1 The UK does get to decide management practice in its EEZ, so long as the rules apply to everyone. So reforms are now possible.
Looking at the FISH stock annexes away from my files, it is very difficult to assess the level of UK win. Very mixed results: some gains in Scottish cod, Irish herring, North Sea hake, Channel sprat.
They are on pp893+. This of course ignore any wins made by enforcing a stronger economic link.

But at first sight, this does not look very impressive at all.

We need more figures to show otherwise. Remember the default in this is total control in UK waters (T&Cs apply).
I can predict five years of arguments as several countries try to argue to increase overall permitted catch as individual shares go down, to retain their current landing size. Scope for increased ecological damage unless gripped.
FISH.8.4 (p266) unfortunately retains access for EU boats currently operating in UK 6 and 12 nm limit. This should have been limited to genuine historic access only, though there is a marginal existing link precondition going back several years
This all makes FISH.17 (p273) important, as it covers termination.

However, triggering this also kills the Trade, Transport, and possibly Aviation agreements as well.

So that's not going to casually happen.
The arrangement gets reviewed every four years. Realistically, that will be just about bartering TAC shares. No hopes for change there.
This section needs serious digging into by MPs. It looks like a bad deal and not one that will lead to taking back full share of catch. I may be missing some key details but at first sight it looks squiffy and it doesn't look like a stepping stone to something better either...
... UNLESS HMG made a specific commitment right now to bin this deal and reopen the Trade and Transport clauses.

I doubt they will. But having signed this, they should be pressed.
The % changes do mask the overall landings sizes. If 10DS are on the ball, they'll release figures showing changes by tonnes and value for proper evaluation. To be fair they should also include landings value by UK and joint waters to show what opportunity's at stake.
I suspect the numberwang on the value of the win (130k tonnes) was lifted purely from quota hopper reporting. Even that is not going to be accurate. So we really do need some proper official stats.
A final complicating option. Fisheries could I suppose be linked into a LPF/Trade renegotiation mentioned earlier. The Commission would then respond by adding transport and other pressure points anyway, so that's only a partial work around even if it prevents an automatic break.
Another area now: legal and judicial cooperation. Perhaps notable to start with that the term JHA has been avoided from the outset.
It was claimed (eg by Denis MacShane) the UK is stuck with HRA98. Actually, LAW.GEN.3 doesn't prevent the UK from reinterpreting how it gives effect to the Convention - nor create an obligation to do so by a law rather than through effective courts.
Certainly I see no reason why the UK could not repeal HRA98 and replace with a Charter of Rights and Responsibilities. Notably it does not here directly reference the Strasbourg Court.
LAW.GEN.5 looks odd but I suspect it is just the m.o. for dealing with the Danish JHA opt out.

The various data exchange terms over fingerprints and VRNs and the like seem straightforward.
LAW.EUROJUST.66 (p309) needs keeping an eye on. The UK will unilaterally decide what powers its Liaison Prosecutor and his assistants will have inside the UK. Parliament should get to debate this in due course.
Title VII (pp312+) provide for honouring national arrest warrants, but not the EAW. They can be issued for crimes that have possible tariffs of a year or more, or sentences passed of four months, and where the crime is also considered to be one locally.
There are specific reasonable grounds for refusing to honour one, and a list of very serious crimes that override these. LAW.SURR.82 states a "political offence" is no defence against extradition. Potentially relevant to NI, and also for Madrid. A win.
Someone facing an order is entitled to a judicial hearing first (LAW.SURR.92, p322). The judicial authority may request more info from the issuer before making a decision, all to be done in a timely manner.
All told the extradition clauses seem to do the job. There might be obscure difficulties with specifics, eg if someone is surrendered by the UK under an AW and there is also an EAW separately sent to the issuing state (LAW.SURR.106) but the preconditions clause could cover that
You will delighted to learn that under TITLE VIII: MUTUAL ASSISTANCE it looks like fines for going down a badly-signposted bus lane or parking will now follow you back from your holiday. Cheers for that one. Colchester and Lambeth Councils are already bad enough.
HS.1 (p362) allows for data access on health security. Frankly multilateral cooperation should be focused through the WHO European offices in Copenhagen as the default anyway, but the access might be handy.
Cyber Cooperation (p363) is permitted, but should not be allowed to otherwise distract from developing capability ongoing through NATO and specific close security partners.
Now onto programmes and finances. From the outset this excludes the UK from regional and social aid. But in any event, we always had a terrible rate of financial return from EU funds in those areas - about half our due share.
So what can the UK participate in? Well, it's listed in Protocol I. Problem is, Protocol I hasn't been written yet.

So some serious questions due from MPs here.
Especially as the list will be agreed by one of those working committees, which can also amend it at will.

Back to the oversight problem.
It's not even clear if the UK will participate as per normal international standards of juste retour, ie getting out as much as it pays in. The EU doesn't like the principle. I can see it being quietly surrendered in committee.
It's also quite possible they might sign back up to ERASMUS+. The problem with that programme is the context - EU support for academia in general, which is planned through pro-EU PR-tinted glasses. Here's the background:
If you thought EIB liabilities were sorted in the WA, think again. UNPRO.2.3 (p372) adds new liabilities if the UK engages in programmes covered by the EIB that lose money. Note separately that under the terms of the EIB repayment, the UK does not get back any profits - just risk
This is a critical element. I suspect this area will be out of view and get out of control, potentially with massive financial consequences. This needs immediate gripping. MPs ought to demand any programme affiliation demands a vote - not shunted through by an SI.
It's not just that committee's work. UNPRO.6 (p381) suggests possible planned back door affiliation to GALILEO.
Notably (UNPRO.8) the membership fees rise from 0.5% baseline now up to 3% in 2026, so there is clearly an intent to sign up to a body of programmes. Incidentally, it would be nice to know what the 0.5% budget commitment in cash terms already is.
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