In the last two threads the focus has been more on the tech than the soldier.

But what about the man (& in the SWW it was men)?

In this thread I want to get at the idea that the tech reflects the society.

1/
I hope by now you see that I am interested in this interface between the human and technology.

In fact, I don't think you can really talk about soldiers and tactics unless you also know something about tech and society.

2/
I'm going to riff a bit more in this thread, rather than give you lots of documents and academic references.

That said, however, there are a couple of things that are worth reading as I shift focus from the kit to the person using it.

3/
I'm going to end up using British points of reference to break into this subject but I don't think that is the end of the matter - and I'm sure others are going to correct me as I develop my argument.

4/
I know there are other excellent & more recent works on the SWW & I hope you're going to get those in your Chrimbo stocking but I want to draw your attention to these.

8/
The first thing to pick up on is that it is my general contention that:

Soldiers cannot shoot straight.

There's plenty of evidence for this, I alluded to it in my SMLE thread.

You'll have to go through my back catalogue of work for the references.

https://twitter.com/warmatters/status/1341375505136820228?s=20

9/
Shooting straight depends on time on the range and soldier physique. Obvs the stress and conditions of battle also frame marksmanship.

10/
But there's also an attitude towards marksmanship.

General Sir Richard Gale, commander of 6 Airborne Div in Normandy & 1 Airborne Corps after Arnhem encapsulated the value placed on marksmanship by professional soldiers when he set out the need for,

'One shot, one man'

11/
The ethos of the professional Army valued marksmanship as an indication of their professionalism.

More than this, I'd contend they did not entirely trust a conscript army to do what was necessary.

12/
And this was partly reinforced by the way that manpower was allocated to them.

Crang observes how psychometric testing allocated the brightest and most able to jobs away from the infantry.

In terms of the overall war effort, this scientific allocation made sense.

13/
But it played havoc for those working on the design and development of small arms for the infantry.

Do you design a weapon for a professional soldier who has the time to develop shooting skills?

14/
OR

Do engineers design a weapon that takes the qualities of the soldier into account and find solutions that take the man out of the loop?

15/
I've already explained Monty's position on small arms optimisation in relation to belt-fed versus mag-fed LMGs but the same could be said for how they approached assault rifles.

16/ https://twitter.com/warmatters/status/1341710092471853056?s=20
For there was plenty of work on weapons that could be fired like a rifle and a sub-machine gun, potentially maximising tactical flexibility.

It is just that the during the SWW the Army rejected them.

17/
The question was how do you define requirements when it isn't clear whether the weapons would be used by a professional or a mass army.

18/
This contrasts with the kind of stories you might hear in a US post-war context where the marksman was venerated.

And if I can find the time, I'll try and get at that separately because it both frames the selection of the EM-2 but also the M-16.

end/
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