Smart @thomaswright08 piece on what an ineffective climate-focused approach to China could look like. I’m perhaps naïve/optimistic, but I would expect the incoming team to be more strategic than the scenario Tom describes, though helpful for him to lay it out clearly.
BUT... https://twitter.com/thomaswright08/status/1341394129549471752

I want to push back on a point that some of the folks Tom interviewed seem to believe, and which is perhaps implicit in the piece (Tom, curious for your views on this).

Does elevating climate to a top-tier foreign policy issue necessarily give China more leverage?

At first blush, the answer might seem to be obviously yes. China accounts for about a quarter of global emissions, so there is no way to achieve climate safety without action by China.

But “leverage” (or asymmetric interdependence, for you IR folks) depends on the politics around this material reality. The question is, what are you willing to do to get the other side to act, and how costly is that action for the other side?

As climate rises as a US priority, it’s true that Chinese climate action becomes more “valuable” for the US. But at the same time, it means that the US is willing to do a lot more—including imposing greater costs on China—to secure it. Not clear that that shift benefits China.

For example, carbon tariffs are on the table in a credible way, not least because they might be essential for getting Congressional support for domestic climate policy. China will have a hard time convincing Congress its climate policies are sufficient to avoid such penalties.

At the same time, climate is easy for China to “concede” because Beijing essentially wants decarbonization, albeit on its own terms (at a pace that does not risk stability, in a way that promotes strategic industries). This reduces China’s ability to wield climate strategically.

The new admin’s “ask” to the Chinese leadership on climate is not just announcements (already got those). Rather, it’s for Beijing to invest more time, energy, and political capital in accelerating decarbonization through the Chinese policy system down to ground level.

This ask is not dissimilar to asks on, say, copyright protection, where the Chinese leadership is not really against it, but has other priorities than pushing it through opposed domestic interests. It’s very different to asks on, say, South China Sea.

So it’s by no means clear that that climate-focused foreign policy tips the balance in China’s favor. I think, all told, the opposite is broadly true. The US looks willing to impose credible costs, and China faces few barriers to conceding.

Certainly going to another country, hat in hand, and saying we really really want this thing, is not a recipe for leverage, as Tom’s piece points out. But to my mind that’s not what a climate-centred foreign policy looks like, and I’d be surprised if that’s what happens.

PS: @thomaswright08, as a proud son of a non-English part of the British Isles, note COP26 is in Glasgow, not London :)