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1/8 THREAD. About three years ago the armies of Nigeria and Cameroon started pursuing a strategy of containing Boko Haram jihadists, a sort of minimum service approach to deal with enemy sitting on state territory. Terrorists played along, under pressure from armies' firepower.
2. Chad was on the offensive, deep in Nigerian territory to secure its trading route. Despite some spectacular assaults on jihadist groups on land, the Lake Chad with its dwindling waters and unadministered islands remained unchecked and unpoliced territory.
3. Cooperation within the Multi National Joint Task Force stagnated. Loss of focus. Lack of political stimulus. Uncordinated intelligence. Complacency. Jihadist elements splintering sending false signals of near collapse. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram
4. While armies earned some military victories, effective governance of conflict zones never followed. Rather, it was jihadists who tried to provide rudimentary governance of their areas while steadily increasing attacks on civilian targets.
5. Then ISWAP strengthened with backing from other franchises in other states. Chad got hit, reacted angrily, President Deby marching to the front line. N'Djamena was briefly disillusioned with the MNJTF, recognising somewhat that the Force was failing. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/islamic-state-franchises-africa-lessons-lake-chad
6. In Nigeria, violence from bandits spread westwards. The country got busy with elections. In Cameroon, a greater threat: Anglophone separatist insurgency intensified after old wounds opened and a string of divisive elections diverted more resources. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-cameroons-anglophone-crisis-crossroads
7. All the while, jihadist elements maintained almost daily attacks on soft civilian targets, with soldiers rather acting as back up to community vigilante groups, especially in Cameroon, enhancing other risks. https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/west-africa/sierra-leone/251-double-edged-sword-vigilantes-african-counter-insurgencies
8. END
Sadly, violence in Lake Chad, much of Sahel will remain high unless there's coordinated fresh political impetus to address pillars on which jihadist elements, large banditry gangs thrive: extreme poverty, weak state presence, governance neglect, climate hardships.
Sadly, violence in Lake Chad, much of Sahel will remain high unless there's coordinated fresh political impetus to address pillars on which jihadist elements, large banditry gangs thrive: extreme poverty, weak state presence, governance neglect, climate hardships.
