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It’s important to remember that, although the 101st Airborne Division did suffer from a surfeit of small arms ammo, their artillery was in much better shape.
The 101st had, in addition to its four arty bns, it had at its disposal a field arty group of two 155-mm gun bns.
The 101st had, in addition to its four arty bns, it had at its disposal a field arty group of two 155-mm gun bns.
Also, a bn of 4.5-in howitzers, and one each of 155-mm and 105-mm gun bns that had withdrawn into the Bastogne perimeter (These two bns lost on 20 Dec. when the field arty group cmdr moved them w/o permission. Gen. McAullife relieved him on the spot) were available.
Because the 101st made a “tailgate jump” into Bastogne, its four arty bns carried considerably more ammunition into battle than they otherwise would have. These additional loads were the saving grace at Bastogne. W/o them, the 101st runs out of arty ammo before aerial resupply.
The biggest shortage was in forward observers and liaison teams. These slots were filled from HQ companies. Comms proved a bugger as well, but did not seriously detract from the guns’ effectiveness.
Arty ammo supply problems emerged principally because of the need to fill the void in sufficient anti-tank weapons. Arty was the most effective instrument to stop German armor and this became its mainstay occupation at Bastogne.
The division’s 81st Airborne Antiaircraft Bn was pressed to the MLR and played a vital AT role. These task organizations also saw all AT and the one TD bn deployed to the MLR and moved as needed to support the inf. This allowed for a flexible and effective response to Ger. armor.
These efforts were abetted by the enemy, whose piecemeal attacks granted flexibility to the defenders, allowing for “smarter”use of precious ammo stocks before the 23 Dec. supply drops. Ger. commanders praised the effectiveness and flexibility of the artillery support at Bastogne
