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A spontaneous #thread exploring the question: why study (why am *I* studying) the post-1853 Shogunate Army and Navy?
I dunno, why study a historic example of how any military in history is founded and shaped?
I dunno, why study a historic example of how any military in history is founded and shaped?
Obviously war wasn't new to Japan, nor was military organization, C3, or anything else. But aside from brief, periodic action to contain agrarian and urban uprising, there wasn't any war in Japan since the Shimabara Rebellion in 1638.
The thing is, Japanese armies were built around systems of vassalage. In the case of my guys up north, the house of Date, the Lord Date had his own direct troops but then he had senior vassals who had their own troops who answered to their boss first before answering to Lord Date
This is not a unified chain of command, and it's not going to do so well in a 19th century war.
Of course that also brings us to military technology.
Of course that also brings us to military technology.
If you've learned anything from #FridayNightHistory I hope one thing is that pre-1853 Japan knew about technological developments. But implementing them into military and
broader civilian use on a massive scale was what was not done.
broader civilian use on a massive scale was what was not done.
So the Shogunate, faced with the US Navy, had to take drastic action in order to shore up its defenses. Some of the feudal clans across the country had some measure of headway, in places like Sendai, Satsuma, and Saga, and were now called upon.
But different vassals of different feudal lords don't answer to the shogun. The Shogunate started building its modern military from its own vassal base, and then recruiting outside it, regardless of a person's caste.
Feudal clans across Japan built their own modern militaries along similar lines, but to broadly surmmarize, it was the units and organizations that recruited regardless of caste that had the best success.
As @pptsapper points out:
"warriors are not soldiers. Warriors don’t transition, because warriors are part of a class. Warriors don’t have tasks, because tasks are antithetical to the undisciplined and chaotic warrior."
Same thing applies to late Edo Japan.
"warriors are not soldiers. Warriors don’t transition, because warriors are part of a class. Warriors don’t have tasks, because tasks are antithetical to the undisciplined and chaotic warrior."
Same thing applies to late Edo Japan.
From here, the discussion of technological progress, of changes in equipment, uniform, firepower, can better progress, because ultimately, building the Shogunate Army and Navy meant that the Shogunate had to hack away at the foundations of its own existence.
So I got on a tangent here: why study/why do I study this short lived 19th century military entity?
1. Because a lot of us take for granted that an army exists, and even if we get that it's been around awhile, we don't usually stop to consider how it was put together.
1. Because a lot of us take for granted that an army exists, and even if we get that it's been around awhile, we don't usually stop to consider how it was put together.
2. Because the equipment and trained personnel of the Shogunate Army and Navy made the Imperial Army and Navy possible, so there needs to be more study of the one to understand the other.
3. Because it represents interesting attempts at hybridization: Shogunate Navy officers carried katana, Shogunate Army officers wore jingasa and straw waraji.
4. Because as said above, in order to make these entities work, the Shogunate had to take action that actively hacked away at the foundations of its own existence. e.g.: a peasant-born officer like Colonel Furuya Sakuzaemon would've had a far harder time making a career, earlier.
4. (cont'd) The cognitive dissonance involved in taking that kind of action is fascinating to me. How do you even DO that? Did the Shogunate leadership understand?
(read Totman's "Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu" and Bolitho's' "Treasures among Men" for more detail on this)
(read Totman's "Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu" and Bolitho's' "Treasures among Men" for more detail on this)
5. Because the general assumption seems to be that the Shogunate had no clue about modern technology and went to its demise wielding swords and bows.
*laughs in records of American Civil War surplus gear and weapons*
*laughs in records of American Civil War surplus gear and weapons*
6. Because it's a case in point of how a military, especially a brand new one, can *faiil*-- the Shogunate Army had a gigantic discipline problem, to the point that its version of the UCMJ instituted late in its existence is mostly "if you do [X], you will be executed."
7. Because (as noted in my quoting @pptsapper above) it's a case in point of how warrior and soldier are two different things, and warrior is not inherently superior.
(To read his full commentary on the topic, see https://angrystaffofficer.com/2016/12/14/stop-calling-us-warriors/ )
(To read his full commentary on the topic, see https://angrystaffofficer.com/2016/12/14/stop-calling-us-warriors/ )
8. Because-- for me personally-- there's a dearth of people studying the Boshin War, late Edo period, and Shogunate reforms, and I'm at the intersection of Japanese studies and American Civil War studies and can see the connections a lot of folks miss, so SOMEBODY's gotta do it!
So that's some of why I study the Shogunate Army and Navy, and their associated people, trends, concepts, and such.
And I hope to god other people start to pay attention, too.
And I hope to god other people start to pay attention, too.
