(THREAD) The « #ArabSprings » started 10 years ago. On Dec. 17th 2010, Mohamed #Bouazizi set himself on fire in #Tunisia. There is a lot to say on the impact of his death on MENA countries until today. But here is a short pitch:

1/ The trigger: #Bouazizi wanted to protest against police harassment after his vegetable trail had been confiscated. Echoing similar grievances, this local incident turned into a national protest. The protest forced President Ben Ali to flee the country (Jan. 14).

2/ Domino effect: Ben Ali’s fall shook MENA because many could relate to Bouazizi’s despair, but also because Tunisia was seen as one of the most stable countries. Protests erupted in Cairo (Jan.25), Sanaa (Jan.27), Manama (Feb.14), Benghazi (Feb.15), and throughout the region.

3/ The fall: these « Arab Springs » led to the fall of Ben Ali (Tunisia), Moubarak (Egypt), Kadhafi (Libya), and later Saleh (Yemen).

4/ National vs regional: despite its regional dimension, 2011 remained defined by national movements and national political contexts. Movements inspired each other because demonstrators shared similar grievances but their demands focused on change at the national level.

5/ Regime solidarity/division: a key factor shaping the outcomes was the link between the heads of State & security forces. The Army refused to shoot protesters in Tunisia, gave away Moubarak in Egypt, stuck to Assad in Syria, was mostly Kadhafi’s praetorian guard in Libya,…

6/ Typology: revolution (TUN, EGY - until counter revolution); uprisings turned into regional conflicts (LBY, SYR, YEM); calculated reforms (MOR, JOR, ALG); uprising repressed (BAH); status quo (LEB, IRQ, KSA, UAE, KWT, QTR).

7/ Did the Arab spring fail ? It’s the wrong question. It happened bc regimes & social balance were exhausted. Structural shocks (demography, uneven growth, weak employability, trade dependency to EU eco cycles) exposed the limits of authoritarian models.

8/ What the uprisings were about: disenfranchisement, anger about corruption & repression and a sense of denied dignity / ppl wanted less regime, better governance; What they were not about: a clear and predetermined political alternative.

9/ The transition’s dilemma: elections, constitutions, power sharing deals were meant to create new social contracts but years of repression led to polit vacuum. The time necessary for polit transitions contradicted the economic urgencies that triggered the uprisings.

10/ Less State, more regime: in many cases, political transitions derailed, security sector reforms stalled, economic grievances remained & nostalgia grew. Some leaders changed but many regimes survived & patronage networks adapted.

11/ Regional influence: main drivers of the uprisings were domestic but support to revolutionary (Turkey; Qatar) or counter revolutionary (UAE, KSA) forces decisively impacted the outcomes. e.g. in Egypt: Turkish support to Morsi ; UAE support to Sissi.

12/ International influence: the initial surprise, adaptation, hesitation or intervention of external actors also played a key role, for instance when US hesitation opened space for Russian & Iran intervention in Syria.

13/ End of the first cycle: the rise of ISIS in Syria & Iraq (2013-2014) as well as its expansion in Libya shifted the international agenda away from support to transitions and renewed the focus on counter terrorism.

14/ New geopolitics: #US trauma on ‘endless wars’ & #Europe’s divisions created space for more assertive powers #Russia, #Iran, #Turkey, #UAE. No hegemon, violent multipolarity, more fait accompli & zero-sum game strategy, limited diplomatic space.

15/ 2019: the Arab springs rationale is not over. Peaceful, leaderless, resilient protests erupted in #Algeria, #Sudan, #Lebanon, #Iraq and led to transitions in Algeria & Sudan, but deadlock in Lebanon & Iraq because political class resist & Iran/US tensions.

16/ Where are MENA countries today? Huge disparities ; Profound political fragmentation & instability ; multiple levels of violence ; structural crises worse than in 2011: #covid #climate #unemployment, etc. e.g. by 2050, 300M more people will enter MENA labor market….

17/ Is there hope? It’s up to local voices from the region. Challenges are daunting but, when they stay out of politics, civil societies innovate locally, individuals find ways to thrive in a globalized world ( #diasporas & #tech), and the cultural shift from 2011 can’t go away.

18/ MENA balance of power in 2021? Regional actors are more autonomous than in the 20th century; 2011 legacy ( #UAE vs #Turkey); anti vs pro #Iran (local militias vs Israel/Gulf #normalization).

19/ MENA & the world in 2021? China more influential but remained trade oriented; Russia has security credibility but few political solutions; Europe very slowly stepping up; Expectations about #Biden may be too high but US remains a unique player.

20/ For a good read on all this, @abuaardvark covers a lot : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2020-12-08/arab-uprisings-never-ended