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The “Golden Lions” of the 106th Infantry Division occupy a tragic place in the historiography of the Ardennes battle. The state of its readiness for battle has proven a fertile field for arguments about the quality of late war draftee divisions, although closer analysis beckons.
Born in March 1943, MG Alan W. Jones’s 106 ID had the misfortune to enter a world where rising casualty numbers increased demand for trained infantry replacements, affecting the ability of stateside units to develop unit cohesion and prepare for deployment.
In the eight months before 106 ID packed its bags for European battlefields, over 7,000 men were transferred to other units whose deployable status superseded its own. Losing 60% of its authorized strength greatly affected its ability to train and cultivate unit esprit.
As one source notes, “In their place came a diverse parade of human material: 1,100 air cadets, 1,500 from other divisions still stationed in the United States, 2,500 from various disbanded units, and men combed out of the supply and quartermaster services.”
Given time and a moratorium on further drafts, this influx of mostly non-infantry types would not have, of itself, posed a problem. However, time was not on MG Jones’s side, and no sooner had his ranks been reconstituted than orders arrived sending the division overseas.
Just as with the battered veteran divisions also occupying the Ardennes sector, many of the men who replenished the ranks of 106 ID were of a higher quality than many who preceded them. Men transferred from USAAF, technical branches, and ASTP, had high military aptitude scores.
The key difference was that outfits like 28 ID had a storehouse of battle wise veterans to integrate the newcomers into units and training was focused on hard experience in the Hurtgen and elsewhere. For instance, the supreme value of patrolling was stressed by veterans in 28 ID.
Other issues manifested themselves: when taking over 2 ID’s positions in the Schnee Eifel, the division’s first priority was the quality of its cantonments, not readiness for battle. Aggressive patrolling to gain familiarity with the terrain and gather intelligence was paltry.
The inattention of inexperienced junior officers led to epidemics of trench foot; despite ample supplies of shoepacs and other cold weather gear essential to troops operating in forward areas under harsh winter conditions, no effort was made to procure them.
In some constituent units of 106 ID, the issue of small arms ammo was restricted, although it too was in plentiful supply. Occupying a main line of resistance not 1000 yards from its enemy, 106 ID gave the impression of a unit not taking the war very seriously.
Those crucial early days on the line before the storm broke over the Ardennes would prove critical to the division’s chances of survival. The failure to gain adequate knowledge of the terrain, enemy, and ensure proper supply, would cost the Golden Lions.
Terrain and deployment also played a role in 106 ID’s rough handling by the enemy. Unlike 28 ID, for whom the Our River was a geographic line of forward defense, 106 ID had the river to its back.
The Schnee Eifel Salient was created when 4 ID’s September attacks came to a halt at the Siegfried Line. This “bulge” in the line made any unit occupying it vulnerable to attack from front and flanks.
106 ID’s three regiments—422nd, 423rd, 424th, arrayed north to south—were deployed in a zig zag fashion thanks to the lie of the Our River and the salient inherited from its predecessors. In fact, the 424th RCT was some miles in rear of its sister units.
Taken together, all of the above factors would see the division enter its first battle at a serious disadvantage to its neighbors, although the performance of its troops would redeem many of the failures of command and intelligence that placed it in a vulnerable state.
