Read on Twitter
Random thread on sea power, aircraft carriers, submarines, etc. Sorry if this comes across as a little jumbled—I’m trying to put some disjointed thoughts on paper.
1. Yes, I wrote an article arguing that a third aircraft carrier might be unnecessary. That does not mean that (a) carriers are useless, (b) submarines and shore-based missiles can make up for the absence of a carrier fleet. https://swarajyamag.com/defence/dont-knock-general-bipin-rawats-land-centrism-it-is-exactly-what-india-needs
But before we get into that, let’s bust a common myth: That “sea denial” and “sea control” are two independent and mutually exclusive ends, and carried out by separate naval platforms. Sea control by carrier task forces, and sea denial by submarines.
Reality is far more complex. Both sea denial and sea control can be done in parallel, and the former can be a subset of the latter in a wider war (see the US Navy in the Pacific theatre in World War II).
Similarly, submarines aren’t exclusively sea denial platforms, and carriers aren’t exclusively sea control platforms either. RAdm Sudarshan Shrikhande explains this in his essay. He writes:
https://www.orfonline.org/research/harnessing-indian-sea-power-post-galwan-considerations-of-time-space-and-force-69573/
https://www.orfonline.org/research/harnessing-indian-sea-power-post-galwan-considerations-of-time-space-and-force-69573/
Getting back to my original point, this also means that neither a carrier fleet not a submarine arm is a substitute for the other.
Air superiority has become a pre-requisite to winning a war in this age. And submarines cannot provide it. Shore-based aircraft can, but they have their limitations.
The chief advantage of a carrier is not that it has a flight deck, but that it is *mobile*. That means it can the enemy doesn’t always know where a carrier is, and a task force can turn up quite unexpectedly and wreak havoc on an enemy that lacks air cover https://twitter.com/JA_Maolankar/status/1337037496266330114
Hard to do all of this with submarines and destroyers alone, no?
“But can you really conceal the whereabouts of a carrier today?” Yes, you can. See related thread
https://twitter.com/elmihiro/status/1075132072673501184
“But can you really conceal the whereabouts of a carrier today?” Yes, you can. See related thread
https://twitter.com/elmihiro/status/1075132072673501184
So, when I argue for foregoing some aspects of naval strength, I’m suggesting that India may just have to live with the military disadvantage for a while, and not that the country can pursue its naval ambitions using cheaper assets.
2. “But what about unsinkable aircraft carriers? We have those, right? Could we set up air bases in the Andamans and use those to choke China’s SLOCs?”. Yes and no.
The good thing about “unsinkable aircraft carriers” is that they … er … cannot be sunk. They’re hardy. And they’re often large enough to accommodate heavier aerial assets (you can’t station a squadron of P-8Is on a Nimitz, but you can on Greater Nicobar”.
The BAD thing about “unsinkable aircraft carriers” is also that they cannot be sunk. Which means that they can be invaded and used against you. The Japanese had so many unsinkable carriers—Tinian, Iwo Jima, Saipan, Guam. Didn’t turn out so well for them, did it?
Unsinkable aircraft carriers are also immobile. Which means they can come under repeated attack and be neutralized. Falklands, anyone?
In other words, island bases require strong defences if they are to be protected against an amphibious invasion, and a reliable logistical chain back to the mainland to maintain those defences. And a navy powerful enough to defend that supply line.
Because you can be damned sure that an enterprising PLAN will make an attempt to seize or suppress these islands. It won’t be easy—the geography makes it practically impossible for China to put an invasion fleet in the Andaman sea without it being spotted. But the risk exists.
And in any case, if India were to secure the island chain and project serious power from it, it will have to build a string of air and naval bases from which to launch sorties.
All that infrastructure, equipment, and manpower is expensive. Prohibitively so. Particularly when the land forces are gearing up to manage rising tension along India’s land borders.
So, are there different means to achieving some form of sea control in the Indian Ocean? Political ones, perhaps? Like inviting the US Navy or Royal Navy or French Navy or all of them to set up ports/airfields there?
Yes, I know it sounds ridiculous. Or does it?
Yes, I know it sounds ridiculous. Or does it?
It will have to be a call that the political leadership will have to take. And it would no doubt pull India into a de-facto alliance with Western powers, with all the benefits and shortcomings of such an entanglement.
3. Which brings me to the utter lack of political direction for the armed forces. India doesn’t even know her own preferred strategic end game. There’s no national security strategy. No defence white papers are issued.
At the military level, we have no real theory of victory, or an understanding of how political ends may be achieved through military means. How can there be, in the absence of political direction? No wonder our “joint military doctrine” is a damp squib. https://thewire.in/government/joint-doctrine-indian-armed-forces-wholly-informational-hardly-doctrinal
Contrast India’s clouded strategic thinking with China’s precise articulation of its military vision. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/why-white-papers-matterthey-allow-a-state-to-craft-its-signals-carefully-india-should-take-a-leaf-from-chinas-book/lite/
And before anyone asks, yes, explicitly articulating goals and doctrines is important. Citing some grand, unstated, Chanakyan strategy—being silently executed away from the prying eyes of the hoi polloi—is next to useless.
If our junior leadership (both civilian and military) isn’t soaking in the higher leadership's vision; if our training academies don't have a doctrine to meld young minds towards, and if the citizenry has no sense of national direction…
… what are institutions and individuals going to do apart from pursuing their own little goals and pulling India in multiple different directions?
Even in the specific case of the Indian Ocean Region, do we really see any serious discussion of the things Rohit mentions? Nope. https://twitter.com/KesariDhwaj/status/1338849707720773632
All we get to hear/read is, “We need a third carrier!” “No you don’t. Here, make do with submarines instead.” "But what if we spent 6% of GDP on defence?"
On land, the situation is no different. The Army's vision of war continues to be dominated by an "orthodox offensive doctrine" that was first trialed in 1965 and has failed at least once (Operation Parakram). https://carnegieindia.org/2020/08/10/army-in-indian-military-strategy-rethink-doctrine-or-risk-irrelevance-pub-82426
