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1/ @threadapalooza of Sociotechnical Diagrams.
These images answer the question: how does tech change society? And how does society change tech?
These images answer the question: how does tech change society? And how does society change tech?
2/ We can start with the original tech <> society loop:
Marx's Base and Superstructure. This is the core reinforcing loop of capitalism.
Base : Tech ::
Superstructure : Society
Marx's Base and Superstructure. This is the core reinforcing loop of capitalism.
Base : Tech ::
Superstructure : Society
3/ Staying at the abstract level, we can formally define the concept of a paradigm:
A paradigm is the feedback loop between epistemology, ontology, and ethics.
We're changing how we understand the world, as the underlying world itself changes, as our goals change.
A paradigm is the feedback loop between epistemology, ontology, and ethics.
We're changing how we understand the world, as the underlying world itself changes, as our goals change.
4/ As a specific example, we can see this paradigm change from the Industrial Age to the Information Age.
5/ Getting more specific, we can view societal evolution from @JoHenrich's perspective of cultural evolution.
Cultural evolution can be understood as biology co-evolving with our culture.
We need culture-bio fit. Marriage norms (culture) are anchored to our pair-bonding bio.
Cultural evolution can be understood as biology co-evolving with our culture.
We need culture-bio fit. Marriage norms (culture) are anchored to our pair-bonding bio.
6/ If we zoom in, bio can be seen as genetics, ontogeny, and psych, while culture can be seen as norms and institutions.
7/ These different layers move at different speeds. e.g. Institutions and genetics are slow.
8/ This should remind you of @stewartbrand's Pace Layers
9/ Henrich's book mostly focuses on WEIRD psychology. He writes: "The cultural evolution of psychology is the dark matter that flows behind the scenes throughout history."
WEIRD psych co-evolved with voluntary orgs from 1000-2000 in Europe. Old kin institutions were outcompeted.
WEIRD psych co-evolved with voluntary orgs from 1000-2000 in Europe. Old kin institutions were outcompeted.
10/ I don't mind Henrich's causal loop diagram above. But I prefer a loopy :)
11/ One way to think of the above is that:
Henrich's explanation accounts for global differences from 1000-2000.
While @jaredmdiamond's GGS accounts for diff from 10000 BCE-1000 CE.
East-West orientation + lucky domesticable plants/animals allowed Eurasia to win.
Henrich's explanation accounts for global differences from 1000-2000.
While @jaredmdiamond's GGS accounts for diff from 10000 BCE-1000 CE.
East-West orientation + lucky domesticable plants/animals allowed Eurasia to win.
12/ Another key diagram in cult evo is the Inglehart-Welzel cultural map.
This reduces human values to two dimensions:
- survival vs. self-expression
- traditional vs. secular
Protestant Europe is top-right, African-Islamic is bottom-left.
Countries move top-right over time.
This reduces human values to two dimensions:
- survival vs. self-expression
- traditional vs. secular
Protestant Europe is top-right, African-Islamic is bottom-left.
Countries move top-right over time.
13/ The other q we can ask is whether values change within a generation (mindset shift) or across generations (generational change from death/birth).
Belief in god changes across generations, while tolerance of individual choice changes within generations.
Belief in god changes across generations, while tolerance of individual choice changes within generations.
14/ Cultural values affect the kinds of institutions we build.
e.g. 1980s USSR had self-expression values (demand for democracy) that were unmet with the USSR.
By the 1990s, those USSR countries had democracy, which matched their demand with supply of democracy.
e.g. 1980s USSR had self-expression values (demand for democracy) that were unmet with the USSR.
By the 1990s, those USSR countries had democracy, which matched their demand with supply of democracy.
15/ Let's go deeper on institutions, starting with @FukuyamaFrancis's framework from Political Order and Political Decay.
A state has three parts:
On one side, you have a strong state.
But it is balanced by rule of law and democratic accountability.
A state has three parts:
On one side, you have a strong state.
But it is balanced by rule of law and democratic accountability.
16/ But how do any of those pillars initially form?
- State often follows from war
- Law often follows from religion
- Democratic accountability often follows from a rising middle class
The image below shows the casual chain for law and accountability.
- State often follows from war
- Law often follows from religion
- Democratic accountability often follows from a rising middle class
The image below shows the casual chain for law and accountability.
17/ We can map this to The Dictator's Handbook.
Accountability (from above) is really just a subset of the population—the winning coalition (wc).
On the left, you have a democracy. Large wc, lots of value from wc.
On the right, authoritarian. Small wc, value from resources.
Accountability (from above) is really just a subset of the population—the winning coalition (wc).
On the left, you have a democracy. Large wc, lots of value from wc.
On the right, authoritarian. Small wc, value from resources.
18/ We can also understand institutions from Coase's frame.
Coase asked: why do we have markets and firms?
B/c markets are good at motivation ($) but not coordination (can't force people to work).
While firms aren't as good at motivation but are better at coordination.
Coase asked: why do we have markets and firms?
B/c markets are good at motivation ($) but not coordination (can't force people to work).
While firms aren't as good at motivation but are better at coordination.
19/ This framework has been used to explain new "peer production" institutions like OSS/Wikipedia, e.g. from @YBenkler's Coase's Penguin.
20/ We can also map Coase's Theorem to @zeynep's networked nonviolent protest.
Social media allowed for more coordination (100k people at a protest), but not the motivation/capacity building (long-term $$ to sustain movement).
This is why Arab Spring was powerful but fragile.
Social media allowed for more coordination (100k people at a protest), but not the motivation/capacity building (long-term $$ to sustain movement).
This is why Arab Spring was powerful but fragile.
Pausing for a bit. Be back soon.
