15th December 1944

Wacht am Rhein - 1 day

The US Twelfth Army Group still has 352VGD in Bitburg, when they have been in their jump off positions for several days.

Regimental & Battalion officers have known of the offensive since yesterday. Their men have no idea.

1)

The 28ID is sent to Belgium/Luxembourg along the German border to rest after suffering c.6,200 combat casualties in the Hürtgen forest 40m to the north-east.

Despite the heavy casualties rec’d in their mauling in the Hürtgen, end November saw the Div back at full strength.

2)

Of the Div’s 3 Infantry Rgts, we focus on the 109th, the most southerly of their displacements on the Our river, between the hamlets of Vianden & Reisdorf.

The 110th are in position in front of Bastogne, with the 112th the most northerly.

3)

It’s important to understand that the 28ID, although back to full strength, had suffered grievously not only in the Hürtgen, but prior to that too.

The Infantry Rgts had sustained terrible losses, with most companies below 50% and almost 1/3 of their officers casualties.

4)

The casualties lost were also often experienced men, exacerbating the degradation of the Div, with the majority replacements not infantrymen by trade.

The rest period prior to 16th December was critical in R&R & training of the replacements.

5)

Now we have context of the ‘Keysone or Bloody Bucket’ Div, we can focus on Lt. Col Rudder’s 109th Inf Rgt (green), located between Vianden & Reisdorf & opposing the 352VGD (red) between Getingen, Ammeldingen & short of Wallendorf.

6)

The 28ID as a whole were holding 25 miles of front, so only limited to fortified positions, including buildings, foxholes & bunkers in the main, rather than a consistent line of defence.

And the 109th alone faced 3 Inf Rgts of 352VGD & elements of 5FJ Div to 352’s north.

7)

352VGD were the re-incarnation of 352ID that fought with distinction at Omaha through to St. Lo in Normandy, where it was destroyed.

The remnants of the old Div along with the 581VGD formed the new unit, in Flensburg September 1944 as part of the 32nd wave.

8)

It was at 98% strength at the time of the offensive, with its Inf Rgts - 914, 915 & 916 Volksgrenadiere consisting of some experienced officers & NCOs with a large amount of former Kriegsmarine personnel, along with Luftwaffe, too.

914VGR were exclusively KM re Grenadiers.

9)

Despite this, it’s C/O Erich Otto Schmidt declared his infantry as having a ‘good fighting spirit’, despite little experience.

Artillery was largely horse drawn & lacking in some basic technical training.

The organic Jagdpanzer Abteilung was untested.

10)

Beyond the shortfalls, the Div was well equipped as a VGD with most of its Kompanien (2 of their 3 Zug (Platoons)) equipped with the Stg44 (a Sturmzug) & 1 conventional Rifle Zug. The remaining Btl Kps being Heavy.

An increased allocation of AT weapons was also a feature.

11)

The context of a VGD was therefore a political blurring of the soldier & people, hence ‘Volk’.

To make up for the trained & physical quality of its men (young & older), an increase in modern weapons was to be a mitigating factor.

So now, I hope the scene is set....

12/end