The vital role played by the 28th Infantry Division’s 110th Regimental Combat Team by delaying the advance of XLVII Panzer Corps, saved the strategic crossroads town of Bastogne, Belgium from capture, and bought time for the arrival of 101st Airborne Division in the area.

Spread out over fifteen miles along the St. Vith-Oiekirch Highway, 110th RCT occupied isolated strongpoints in the center of the division’s front along the Our River. Unfortunately for the 110th, their deployment placed them on one of the most direct routes to Bastogne.

With Col. Hurley Fuller losing control of the battle as soon as it began, the 110th’s struggle to “hold at all costs” was reduced to a series of actions fought at the lowest echelons of command, usually no higher than company HQ and frequently below.

Regimental HQ’s loss of relevance to the unit’s battle was not a result of any failure of its CO, Col. Fuller. Rather, the widely dispersed elements of the regiment made command and control virtually impossible as each position was isolated and destroyed/bypassed by the enemy.

What made the difference, and is all the more remarkable given the 110th’s losses in the Hurtgen the month before, was the determined nature of the resistance offered the Germans. For two full days, Col. Fuller’s men bought the time to deploy SHAEF’s strategic reserve to the area

Though the sacrifice of the 110th saved Bastogne, the regiment was virtually destroyed as a combat effective formation, suffering an appalling 2,500 casualties.

It was the second time in a month that the 28th ID had had to reconstitute an entire regiment.

The Hurtgen had taken a fearful toll on the 28th Infantry Division. During its stay in the “Death Factory,” the division suffered over 6,000 casualties, the heaviest in the 112th Infantry, which had been reduced to 300 men. It had entered the forest with more than 2,200.

In the 110th, losses after reinforcement saw one battalion left with 57 men when the division halted its attacks. On one day alone (8 Nov.), 2/112 required 515 replacements, out of an authorized strength of 850. The costs to leadership were just as dire.

Authorized 828 officers, the division lost 249 to all causes. One in three. The NCO ranks were similarly decimated. The heavy attrition of the Hurtgen battles and the reliance on regular replacements to fill losses required leaders to expose themselves more than normal.

All of this leads to the question, with such losses, how did the division perform so well the following month?

Training. As the wounded returned, and the quiet of the Ardennes permitted plenty of maneuver space, the division rebuilt itself physically, if not spiritually.

The unique nature of the division’s deployment in the Ardennes—isolated strongpoints in towns and villages centered on road nexuses—allowed for a period of intensive training in basic inf tactics, patrolling, and route marches to build endurance and cohesion.

Many replacements came from outside the infantry, with USAAF and AAA units being the most common source and the since-cancelled ASTP program, which handed the infantry a gift of bright, well-educated young soldiers, who adapted well and were motivated to the task.

These high quality replacements—one author calls them a “cut above” any received previously—were a godsend. More important, and most crucial to the grim task of blunting the German attack, was the veterans of the Hurtgen, many WIA the month before, who held the outfit together.

I recommend anyone seeking more information about the training and organization of US infantry divisions to read Peter Mansoor’s ‘The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945.’

Specific to the 28th Infantry Division, consult Michael E. Weaver’s ‘Guard Wars: the 28th Infantry Division in World War II.’

A 1994 MA thesis by MAJ Jeffrey Holt prepared for US Army CGSC on the operational performance of 28 ID is also strongly recommended.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a284499.pdf

A 1985 MA thesis by MAJ John S. Brown re mobilization & training is essential reading.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a164741.pdf

Thank you for your indulgence. It was a long one. #WWII #SWW #History