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Earlier today, the Kuwait National Assembly re-elected @MarzouqAlghanim as speaker (33-28 / 3 invalid ballots). Many are disappointed & surprised, given that 42 / 50 elected MPs publicly committed to vote for an alternative, @BaderNAlhumaidi. What happened? THREAD /1
For over a week, the 42 MPs have held meetings to coordinate & prevent defection (the ballot is secret). There are 50 elected MPs in the KNA and 16 ministers. One minister was out of the country and another also serves as an elected MP. So there were 64 votes in total. /2
This means that the government had 14 ministers going into the vote. Let us assume they also had the 8 elected MPs who did not publicly commit to voting for Al-Humaidi (1 is a minister). Going into the election, there were 22 Marzouq votes & 42 Al-Humaidi votes. /3
To win, Marzouq & the government needed to convince 11 of the MPs who publicly supported Al-Humaidi to defect. Again: the ballot is secret. Some MPs have been complaining about this for days. Some called for transparency prior to the vote. It did not work. /4
The real question is not -- why did so many MPs betray the cause to which they committed publicly? It is -- why didn't more do the same? 5/
The government and its allies use a tried & tested system that relies on the distribution of economic rents, policy concessions, & other perks to ensure compliance & loyalty in the KNA. This is a stable, reliable, & effective commitment mechanism. 6/ https://osf.io/fjdw5/
In contrast, the electoral system - SNTV ("one vote") in 10 member districts - atomizes candidates. It prevents them from forming ideology-, personality-, or group-based coalitions. It discourages cooperation & blocs in the KNA. It encourages clientelism & vote-buying. /7
But most importantly, it prevents candidates from developing the very same commitment mechanisms the government & its allies wield so powerfully & effectively. There was, quite literally, nothing unifying the 42 MPs who publicly supported Al-Humaidi. /8
Some opposed Marzouq personally, some did so ideologically, & some just wanted to join the bandwagon (perhaps only to raise their own "price" of defection?). I mean, Bader Al-Humaidi is not Che Guevara. He is himself generally pro-government - and a former minister. /9
We knew from a similar episode in 2016 that 1) there would be some defection on the day of the vote & 2) some elected MPs were likely planted among the 42 by Marzouk & the government themselves. /10
So, if you are one of the 42 MPs, you might be thinking: "Well, I cannot trust the other 41 to vote for Al-Humaidi - why not negotiate with the government & see what I can get? Why vote for a candidate who is, in all likelihood, going to lose?" /11
The politics of elite exchange in Kuwait are opaque. But we should not be surprised by this outcome. It is a system designed to limit coordination & allow the government & its allies to negotiate with individual elected MPs in increasingly transactional ways. It worked. /12
I have written elsewhere about the pitfalls of the SNTV ("one vote") system. Electoral reform will not simply make all of these problems go away. It may create new ones, much like the 2006 reforms did. /13 https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/evolution-kuwaiti-opposition-electoral-politics-after-arab-spring/
But today's events indicate that the system is breeding cynicism, distrust, & disillusionment in new & unanticipated ways. Given the magnitude of the challenges Kuwait faces - as well as strong public enthusiasm for reform - this vote will be interpreted as a setback. /14
Secret votes, public deception, & status quo politics are likely signs that robust opposition & support for reform from within the KNA are dead on arrival. /15
