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I'd like to read the cases in more depth before I say anything too definitive on this, but I have some preliminary thoughts. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-supreme-court-sends-signal-to-appeal-courts-to-overturn-seven-rulings/?utm_medium=Referrer:+Social+Network+/+Media&utm_campaign=Shared+Web+Article+Links
First, it is of course true that appellate courts should and do defer to trial judges on matters pertaining to credibility. It is often said that this is because the trial judge was able to see and hear the witnesses, whereas appellate courts are not.
Frankly, in an era when the significance of demeanour has been brought into question, one may reasonably ask how much deference should be given to trial judges *on this basis*.
Of course, the more that credibility findings rest on alleged internal inconsistencies, intrinsic implausibility, or implausibility in light of other evidence at trial, the less persuasive is the argument that trial judges are in a better position than appellate court judges.
Indeed, back in the mid-20th century, when courts were really still wrestling with the scope of appellate review on questions of fact, it was argued by some that appellate courts should distinguish between findings of primary fact and those of secondary fact.
The latter concerned the inferences to be drawn from more foundational fact findings. The argument was that, since appellate courts are in no worse position to know what inferences are reasonably available, the case for deference w/r/t secondary facts is diminished.
These sorts of arguments have fallen by the wayside. The idea that deference is owed to trial judges by virtue of their unique position, has become a sort of mantra.
Now, one could argue that this reflects a sort of fetishistic attitude towards demeanour. (See, e.g., R v NS.) But I think it more reflects the value of finality in criminal proceedings. There cannot be endless challenges to fact-findings and trial verdicts.
This is so even if the reasoning employed by trial judges is decidedly imperfect. Trials - including criminal trials - are a means of resolving disputes. And if they are to serve this function, then verdicts must be *settled*.
Second, folks on the defence side should take little comfort from Cote J's consistent-ish track record of dissenting in the cases discussed by @SeanFineGlobe.
As I have suggested in the past, Cote J arguably has a flawed sense of the role of the SCC - which is not a court of error correction, but for the interpretation and development of the law.
Third, the idea that trial judges may reject the testimony of either defendants or complainants on the basis that it is intrinsically implausible in light of how people would normally act under X conditions is also coming under pressure.
To the extent one relies on "common sense and experience" in order to say that the complainant's or defendant's story *cannot be ruled out*, that is clearly fine.
But it is not so clear that common sense and experience about how people behave can, without more, be relied upon to reject testimony.
If one wants to rest a credibility finding on ideas about how people act then, in principle, one either needs expert evidence or one needs to take judicial notice - and, importantly, use the highly demanding Morgan criteria to do so.
I think the SCC has been reluctant to say this in so many words - largely because of concerns about finality and judicial economy.
But perhaps also because it introduces too much artificiality into the judge's assessment of credibility - requiring the judge to jettison or suspend his or her own common sense.
Fourth, like @petersankoff, I am somewhat troubled by Delmas. It seems to me that there are consciously under-examined undercurrents in the sexual assault case law about the significance of "relationships".
Finally, I don't think it is too much to ask that, if trial judges are to receive "social context" training, mandatory or otherwise, this be open to public scrutiny - if only to alleviate concerns.
