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1/ Recommend pairing this important piece by @ChuBailiang with the slew of recent pieces by other Chinese scholars, such as Fu Ying, Jie Dalei, Huang Jing, etc., to get a feel for a core tension that Chinese policymakers are grappling with. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/world/asia/china-nationalists-covid.html?smid=tw-share
2/ On one hand, there is a strong audience for a foreign policy of preemptive triumphalism. As @Chubailiang points out, even though Xi has kept a measured reserve in his public comments, Chinese spokespeople, media outlets, artists, and opinion-shapers have embraced the attitude.
3/ PRC counterparts have explained to me that it's difficult to challenge preemptive triumphalism, both because it is popular and also because it frames the Chinese leadership in the type of positive glow and flattering comparison with the West that they appreciate.
4/ At the same time, experienced foreign policy practitioners recognize the risks they are incurring by unleashing these nationalistic impulses. They understand that these messages do not travel well overseas, that they could limit decision space for future policy decisions...
5/...and that by going further and further in embracing a nationalism-fueled foreign policy approach, the Chinese leadership is abandoning a more traditional foreign policy posture that served it well over its rapid rise over the past four decades.
6/ The last time there was public debate about China's foreign policy direction, then-State Councilor Dai Bingguo spoke up and ended the debate with an authoritative piece in Xinhua - http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2010-12/06/content_1760381.htm. Is there anyone who could - or would want to - play that role now? End.
