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[THREAD]
Could the
2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War have been avoided?
————————
Sept. 27th military attack by caught many by surprise. Scholars focusing on the Caucasus mostly argue that military confrontation was on the horizon.
Yet, the answer still isn’t an easy YES or NO
Could the
2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War have been avoided?————————
Sept. 27th military attack by
caught many by surprise. Scholars focusing on the Caucasus mostly argue that military confrontation was on the horizon.Yet, the answer still isn’t an easy YES or NO
2. Numerous factors play a role in the continuation of the dormant but deadly conflict regarding NK War. Of course, in the later 2010s, much can be blamed on the poorly executed and planned foreign policies by PM Nikol Pashinyan.
However, ...
PM Nikol Pashinyan.However, ...
3. In order to understand the factors that best explain if the 44-Day War of 2020 was avoidable or not, let’s first understand why this ticking time bomb was even ticking in the first place: the 1994 Ceasefire.
The ceasefire was effectively implemented by then-engaged OSCE...
The ceasefire was effectively implemented by then-engaged OSCE...
4. ...co-chairs: USA, France, Russia. As a result, Armenia guaranteed the security of Artsakh (ethnic-Armenian region that declared independence from Azerbaijani SSR in 1990 based on Soviet Law of Succession), and controlled the buffer regions that were part of Azerbaijani SSR.
5. Azerbaijan was the loser in warfare, and took it to negotiate through diplomatic means. What’s important to note is that in the 1990s, Azerbaijan did not receive legitimate support other than mujahideen and other foreign fighters. Their organization did not match Armenia.
6. Nonetheless, the 1994 ceasefire led to negotiations within the OSCE Minsk Group framework to come to an eventual agreement that fits the interests of and , featured by the co-chairs’ brokerage.
Which, in itself, the OSCE Minsk Group is part of the ticking time bomb.
and , featured by the co-chairs’ brokerage.Which, in itself, the OSCE Minsk Group is part of the ticking time bomb.
7. So, let’s take a step back and see what was the difference between the negotiations’ atmosphere in the 1990s versus the 2000s, 2010s, and the surface scratch of the 2020s.
& were cooperating much more closely and respectfully than what we see today. Both sides suffered...
& were cooperating much more closely and respectfully than what we see today. Both sides suffered...
8. ... heavily in the 1990s with a couple of hundred thousand refugees as a result of war and ethnic cleansing. Ethnic Armenians were displaced as a result, forced to leave , while ethnic Azerbaijanis were forced to leave Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). And though negotiations...
, while ethnic Azerbaijanis were forced to leave Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). And though negotiations...
9. ... started in the 1990s, it was difficult for the Armenian administration to find a formidable option in accordance with public opinion. Hence, leading to the resignation of the first administration. Though the following Armenian administration was keen on mending ties in ...
10. .. and utilizing diplomacy as a form to find a peaceful resolution, and were super close to finalizing the deal after Kocharyan-H.Aliyev met in 
. But unfortunately, Aliyev did not fulfill the finalization. Hence, commencing the stalemate in negotiations.
. But unfortunately, Aliyev did not fulfill the finalization. Hence, commencing the stalemate in negotiations.
11. As Ilham Aliyev takes control of Azerbaijan in 2003, both & notice heavy levels of nationalist policies and rhetorics pushed. For Aliyev, this meant stronger levels of propaganda and national sentiment of defeat looking for revenge, while began investing in Artsakh.
& notice heavy levels of nationalist policies and rhetorics pushed. For Aliyev, this meant stronger levels of propaganda and national sentiment of defeat looking for revenge, while began investing in Artsakh.
12. The settlement and investments in Artsakh were brought to the UN’s attention by , voicing concern that was not dedicated to OSCE Minsk Group process, and had already come to a status regarding Armenian controller territories of former soviet Azeri regions that are also
, voicing concern that was not dedicated to OSCE Minsk Group process, and had already come to a status regarding Armenian controller territories of former soviet Azeri regions that are also
13. ancestral lands for Artsakh Armenians.
begins to view Armenian Affairs from a hawkish perspective with policies geared towards development of Artsakh; Armenian military defense cooperation with the neutral OSCE co-chair Russia. Thus, communication becomes rough between
begins to view Armenian Affairs from a hawkish perspective with policies geared towards development of Artsakh; Armenian military defense cooperation with the neutral OSCE co-chair Russia. Thus, communication becomes rough between
14. &, and ultimately leads to a stalemate and increasingly polarizing dialogues and actions. One that specifically triggers is the beheading of Lt. Gurgen Magaryan by Ramil Safarov.
Not to mention, the 2007/2008 increased efforts of to bring Nagorno-Karabakh ...
&, and ultimately leads to a stalemate and increasingly polarizing dialogues and actions. One that specifically triggers is the beheading of Lt. Gurgen Magaryan by Ramil Safarov.Not to mention, the 2007/2008 increased efforts of
to bring Nagorno-Karabakh ...
15. ... to the attention of international community. Question many of you may be thinking: well, why did Azerbaijan not use military aggression from the beginning? 1. Had no real ally to vouch outside of Minsk Process; and wasn’t ready to attack. So, oil diplomacy took off.
16. Azerbaijan utilizes oil diplomacy and caviar diplomacy (per OCCRP research) to effectively bring awareness to its interests. Which in this case, was to get NK back. Azerbaijan effectively rallied Azerbaijanis thru the common pain of the 1992-1994 loss, commonly referenced
Azerbaijanis thru the common pain of the 1992-1994 loss, commonly referenced
17. to events such as Khojaly as a common unifying tragedy to build foreign policy around.
As Azerbaijan increased military capabilities in the Caspian Sea, and separately through Israeli and Turkish arms and intelligence, Azerbaijan slowly shifted commitment to military means.
As Azerbaijan increased military capabilities in the Caspian Sea, and separately through Israeli and Turkish arms and intelligence, Azerbaijan slowly shifted commitment to military means.
18. While Azerbaijan aimed to militarize and regroup from the 1994 loss, Armenia in the meantime depended on Russian interests to further stall and keep the status quo playing in favor. Which raises the question, if military expenditure was skyrocketing in , why wasn’t
favor. Which raises the question, if military expenditure was skyrocketing in , why wasn’t
19. revamping and modernizing its military equipment as a form of retaliation. This is where my analysis would suggest that Armenia relied on Russia. However, if Azerbaijan were to bring a non-OSCE member to increase interest, then that would offset the status-quo favoring .
revamping and modernizing its military equipment as a form of retaliation. This is where my analysis would suggest that Armenia relied on Russia. However, if Azerbaijan were to bring a non-OSCE member to increase interest, then that would offset the status-quo favoring .
20. Remember, the CSTO and the separate bilateral agreements between & 
is in regards to Armenia proper — not Nagorno-Karabakh. Hence, Armenia relied on to protect 
- border, while focused on Artsakh on its own against . Which, realistically, had the defensive
& is in regards to Armenia proper — not Nagorno-Karabakh. Hence, Armenia relied on to protect - border, while focused on Artsakh on its own against . Which, realistically, had the defensive
21. advantage given the terrain and advantageous partnership with co-chair . Furthermore, joined the EAEU in the 2010s which further connects to , which ultimately resorted to military action in ‘16 as a form of displeasure in negotiations. But stops just 4 days in.
. Furthermore, joined the EAEU in the 2010s which further connects to , which ultimately resorted to military action in ‘16 as a form of displeasure in negotiations. But stops just 4 days in.
