Very true, but the user services also need to be prepared for the long haul that is product development, as versus cursing DPSUs or pvt sector for invariable delays that arise from trying to squeeze in decades of development into one program. https://twitter.com/blackbirds91/status/1338203418385498112

Consider the Tejas, a fighter which CAG notes suffered from the lack of an IAF liason group all the way from 1989. The IAF has no program management organization, so as a result all its efforts are ad hoc, program dependent. Capable officers are often posted out.

The IAF, IA etc prefer to pay what is premium to the folks abroad for their test flights, production engineering effort, undergone which is why we end up paying a $ 9Bn bill plus, minus a few odds and ends for a mere 36 Rafale wherein we won't spend a fraction on the Tejas.

The Marut was never taken forward, HAL never gained the knowledge to design and make its own fighters bar some hand me down assembly from MiG, BAE and later Sukhoi. No "why", just build to print and manufacture to spec, process.

HALs design ability was whittled away as IAF was fed a glut of "cheap" MiG-21s and some high end Mirages, Jags. There was no incentive to make locally. No strategic vision from the IAF either to set up a product design organization. Left to ADA, and any failure was its alone.

Without user involvement bar a handful of elite test pilots/ flight test establishment, the program meandered. Decisions from the program teams - "x not available/delayed, import" or "import is problematic/indigenize", were left to meander.

Imagine the challenge faced by HAL, ADA and their ecosystem. They had to make a mini Mirage 2000 in the form factor of a MiG-21 footprint, but with no prior experience- the Indo German Marut was long gone, and so were the people who worked on it.

The foreign design teams who were tapped as consultants had their own axes to grind. Some helped, some didn't. US helped till sanctions. The LCA team flew the fighter on a mere handful of engines and actuators, shuffling them between airframes.

While technology development was going on, HAL was also grappling with trying to reduce weight to meet overambitious SQRs. It might be worth remarking Gripen E didnt meet its original weight targets - this after decades of Gripen/Viggen/Draken.

Then they had to squeeze in all the tech developed by first time vendors into a compact airframe. IAF rejoins the program and the changes become legion. All stuff squeezed in between a handful of TDs, PVs, LSPs on a tight budget. Again, a first time effort.

None of this would have been as hard as it was, if post Marut the IAF has decided like the IN it wanted to be a builders AF, not dependent on imported arms, worked towards a long term roadmap. Each fighter would have cracked some tech, some testing, production engg experience.

To do this it would have to set up a program management organization staffed with its best, a mix of fighter and engg staff, who'd work closely with HAL, pvt industry, DRDO to lead and cooperate on key designs that would share common modules, technology and learnings.

We didn't do that. As a result, what we were left with, was the all or nothing approach, wherein we coupled technology development, a high risk approach and product development all in one program.

The Tejas was not just about a FBW, state of the art fighter. It also had to be the lightest and smallest (which meant the most compact avionics), also had to have an engine which had a "flat rated thrust", also had FBW, a modern MMR and so on and so forth.

Why all this at one go? Because unlike the rest of the world, we had no programs other than the Tejas to develop all these technologies. So everything was shoehorned into one program to get the minimal funding and develop these items. Risk ballooned.

The answer then is for the services to work closely with DPSUs and pvt sector both, earmark funding for R&D and start running today for programs that will appear a decade from now. And fund orgs like the Army Design Bureau seriously, not some desk job, that just pushes emails.

The answer is in subsystems and integration both. HAL/ADA would have had a far easier task with the Tejas if HAL had cut its teeth on aircraft between Marut and Tejas, and if ADA had experienced suppliers who had matured technology before the Tejas itself.

This requires the services to move beyond the emergency import jig. They have to ID technologies, designate their best to orgs working on them and settle in for the long haul. Otherwise the import challenge will never really abate.

To blame the DPSUs for being so lousy at time management regarding weapons development is to ignore the fact that India is yet to industrialize across the board, capacity building takes time and effort. One can't simply "build" trained engineers.

The first step is infra. Once you have that, you can deploy staff hitherto inexperienced but trained via foreign consultants who know some things but not all, who work/experiment on the rest. Its tiring, frustrating and thankless. Serendipity is rare, persistence is essential.

This approach is often dismissed as "empire building". Unfortunately without this "empire" you have nothing. Without TSAAGI or NASA cracking aero codes, there would be no Flankers or X-planes.

In short, stay the course, import only for the short term, because over the long term the strategic premium bring paid to armament designers abroad has huge costs.

We run to France, Russia and now the US when China threatens us. The Scorpene data was leaked. Rafale is in service worldwide. So is the S400. Even if your gear is customized, the general specs and capabilities are now available to your near peer competitors or even your rivals.

We pay through our nose for imports, and yet, we can't manage pensions and imports both. Somewhere along the way, we have to wake up and realize indigenization has to be accelerated. Not again thrown into disarray for licensed manufacture at ridiculous prices.

People need to understand how spinoffs work. The X band TRMs in the Tejas's Uttam can be used for strategic radars for BMD to the QRSAMs radars to the Atulya ADFCR. That's a big step on the path technological independence.

The Israelis took the Tejas approach, albeit more conservative, with the Lavi. It got cancelled, but its avionics, weapons all sparked an export boom that IAI is still riding. And its design ended up, albeit heavily modified into the J10. They made their shekels count.

Today, the Tejas is a technology generator. The avionics developed for it, are in the Su30, the Jaguar and its newest variants are again headed im advancing our Brit, Russian fighters.

From MFDs, to FBW, to radar, EW and composites - Indian aerospace development all harkens back to one program, the Tejas. For Indian warfighters to truly have cutting edge gear whose capabilities only they know about, the Tejas Mk2, AMCA are essential.

The AF have to maintain the long term view. Embed themselves keenly into program management but also push for more and more local gear. Its hard nosed strategic calculus. Countermeasure protection, and also quicker local development if suppliers are profitable.

Developing a simple fighter in lieu of the Tejas wouldn't have been helpful either. You'd not have the base to attempt a 5G program today, but would be looking to make a Tejas instead when the world was beginning to field 5G and contemplating 6G.

Net, this is why canceling the MWF and jumping to the AMCA doesn't work. Its too ambitious and a stretch goal, because we ate stopping at 123 Tejas Mk1/A. You need a fighter in between to keep learning, iterating and retain the skilled crew.

At the same time, canceling the MWF and remaining at 4G++ would be akin to having started a simple program instead of the Tejas. You 'll miss the low observable bus and the true system of systems fighter approach.

All in all, the IAF needs to prep for the long haul. Set up a dedicated org which steers these programs along with the developers and does not depend on dynamic personalities alone to push for success. That organizational continuum is what is essential.