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Iran was a democracy--of sorts--for a brief period in the 20th century. Were relations "stable and peaceful"? Not exactly. Thread 1/ https://twitter.com/McFaul/status/1337460347033141248
Iran's period of constitutional government began with the 1906-1911 Constitutional Revolution. A coalition of actors forced the Qajar shah to submit to the nation's first written constitution, which created a parliament (the Majlis) and bound the shah's arbitrary authority. 2/
An American, Morgan Shuster, came to Iran in 1911 to serve as financial advisor to the new government. Shuster wrote a book about his experiences, and he praised the efforts of Iran's revolutionaries as they fought against dictatorial govt and foreign imperialism. 3/
Shuster nevertheless registered displeasure with Iran's elite, who he found self-serving and corrupt. Rather than serve the nation's interest, "They had reached the conclusion that it was far safer and easier to become the tools, agents and protégés of the Russian govt..." 4/
"...than to side with their own people who were struggling heroically, but with all the faults of inexperience and ignorance of the technique of representative government weighing heavily against their efforts.” 5/
Shuster expressed a view which would recur throughout the US encounter with Iran over the next fifty years: namely that the country's leadership appeared unable, or unwilling, of governing the country adequately. 6/
In 1921, the constitutional govt fell under the control of the military dictator Reza Khan, who crowned himself shah in 1925. This effectively suspended constitutional rule. The new govt hired another American, Arthur Millspaugh, to oversee the finances between 1921 and 1927. 7/
Millspaugh was initially quite hopeful that Iran's new government would manage the nation's transition into modernity. The nation's financial troubles were "a symptom of a disorder rather than the disorder itself…There is abundant financial ability among the Persians.” 8/
Millspaugh was relieved of his post in 1927. He grew bitter during the 1930s, criticizing the modernizing plans of Reza Shah in 1933 and predicting the govt would collapse without his strong rule. 9/
In August 1941, British and Soviet armies invaded Iran and deposed the shah. Thus began a new period of quasi-democratic government, where the parliament--or Majlis--shared power with the shah's young son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. 10/
Americans came to Iran in significant numbers during the war, serving as advisors to the government and facilitating the movement of supplies through the occupied country. They developed views on the national politics which emphasized their chaotic nature. 11/
A guide for U.S. Army personnel helpfully pointed out that Iranians “belong to the so-called Caucasian race, like ourselves,” and were to be treated with the proper courtesy and respect owed to white Europeans. 12/
At the same time, most Americans saw Iran as a place of backwardness—a quintessential “Oriental” land, suffering from “the evils of greedy minorities, monopolies, aggression and imperialism,” according to Patrick J. Hurley, the President’s Middle East envoy. 13/
. A report from the military attaché in November 1942 described Iranians as “appallingly illiterate,” led by a political class who welcomed U.S. help “because…we will in some magic American way step in and save them from the British and Russians." 14/
There was no confidence in the Iranian government to maintain the country’s internal stability: the fall of Rezā Shah had produced a form of constitutional democracy, “for which [the] country was ill-prepared,” according to Minister Louis G. Dreyfus. 15/
These views extended into the postwar period. Iran appeared threatened by Soviet pressure. John Jernegan of the State Dept suggested the country would need a "strong man" to maintain order. "Iran is a backward country and not fully prepared for democratic processes. 16/
Between 1946 and 1950, the United States supported a series of governments aligned with the shah. There was a constant sense of frustration with the parliamentary politics, which saw prime ministers and cabinets rise and fall in rapid succession. 17/
In 1950, US officials lost patience with the course of Iran's nascent democracy. The shah “has neither the character nor the ability to offer his people guidance," wrote Asst. Sec. George C. McGhee, who suggested backing a "strong man" government led by General Ali Razmara. 18/
Razmara, who the shah reluctantly made prime minister in June 1950, fit a mold which would become familiar during the latter decades of the Cold War. American officials described him as an "able army administrator" who "gets things done." 19/
Razmara was also a highly-ambitious politician and military commander who had been angling for months to secure the premiership. Ultimately, his time as PM was a failure, as he proved unable to resolve Iran's economic problems or satisfy the country's nationalists. 20/
Razmara was assassinated in March 1951. A few months later, Mohammed Mosaddeq--a popular constiutionalist--became PM. US reactions to the new PM were almost universally negative. 21/
This thread has already gotten quite long, and US attitudes towards Mosaddeq are well-documented--I touch on them in this article for @TXNatSecReview. The US and UK collaborated to remove Mosaddeq from power in August 1953. 22/ https://tnsr.org/2019/11/the-collapse-narrative-the-united-states-mohammed-mossadegh-and-the-coup-decision-of-1953/
A crucial component of the US attitude towards the Mosaddeq govt was the issue of competence--US docs reflect American views that the National Front was incapable of managing Iran without the support of oil revenues. 23/
Iranian democracy during the 1941-1953 was not very democratic, as elections were generally rigged and suffrage incomplete. The US, however, had already determined before 1953 that Iran was not "ready" for democracy, and needed a strong man to prevent it's fall to communism. 24/
Operation TPAJAX was the most visible (and best remembered) expression of this position. Yet the attitude lingered on for decades: a consistent skepticism of Iranian competence and a feeling that the country could not govern itself. 25/
It is entirely accurate, therefore, to note that the most stable period of US-Iran relations was when the country was ruled by an authoritarian dictator--the shah, from 1953-1979--who was pro-Western, pro-capitalist, and anti-communist. 26/
However, this was not due to the Iranian people's rejection of democracy--far from it. Rather, it stemmed from a multitude of historical factors, not least of which was the American attitude that an Iran in the hands of the shah was a "safe" Iran, while one where democracy... 27/
...was allowed to flourish represented a dangerous and unpredictable situation which might jeopardize other US interests (historically, the containment of the Soviet Union and secure access to the petroleum resources of the Middle East). 28/
The Iranian people will decide for themselves what manner of govt they would like for their own country. I hope the Amb. keeps an open mind & looks to history for insight into how the US and Iran can once again enjoy peaceful and stable relations. 29/ End https://twitter.com/McFaul/status/1337460347033141248?s=20
